

JUNE, 1969

VOL. 56, NO. 334

In the first of a 3-issue study of United States military commitments around the world, seven authors examine the history of United States military commitments in Latin America. The introductory article describes the unilateral interventions of the United States in Latin America after 1810 until, in the 1920's, the United States "was so secure in the Western Hemisphere that it no longer felt the need to intervene by force in the countries to the south for its own security."

The U. S. in Latin America to 1933: An Overview

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THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP of the United States to Latin America was one of involvement rather than commitment from the beginning of Latin American independence in about 1810 to 1933. Even involvement reached the major proportions of a declared war on only two occasions in that period: during the war of 1846-1848 with Mexico, and during the war of 1898 with Spain over Cuba. Yet there were many lesser involvements, especially in the United States' primary defense zone, the Caribbean Sea-Gulf of Mexico area. After the turn of the century, these involvements tended to blur the distinction—implicit in the Monroe Doctrine—between involvement and commitment, for they took the form of interventions leading to the establishment of United States protectorates or satellites which the United States was then obligated—and thus committed—to help defend. The extension of this commitment from the Caribbean area to the rest of Latin America, though

not carried out until after 1933, was prefigured in Woodrow Wilson's projected Pan American Pact of 1914-1916.

Of the present Latin American states, Haiti was the first to declare (1804) and win her independence, and Cuba's was not won until 1898. However, the term "Latin American wars of independence" is commonly applied to the conflicts between 1810 and 1825 that resulted in the liberation of Brazil from Portugal and of all the continental dominions of Spain from Mexico (which then included Texas, New Mexico and California) southward to Cape Horn.

The United States remained neutral throughout this 15-year struggle. The political sympathies of its government and most of its people favored the liberation movement. But the great powers of Europe, most of which were ruled by absolute monarchs leagued together in what was commonly called the Holy Alliance, opposed the Latin American cause. Since the United States was

then a very minor power, President James Monroe (1817-1825) dared not aid the Latin American patriots for fear that he might provoke an overwhelming counterintervention by the "allied despots" of Europe.

As a result, the United States never became involved in the struggle as a belligerent. Yet in a broader sense it was involved. Many of its citizens aided the Latin American cause, either as combatants, or by helping to provide the patriots with munitions and warships, or as propagandists. The Latin American wars also occasioned a great expansion of the United States Navy's operations in the Caribbean and around South America to protect United States merchant ships, merchants and seamen. In 1821, the earlier practice of sending occasional warships to the west coast of South America gave way to the establishment of the Pacific Station, a permanent naval force based on ports in Chile and Peru and operating northward to Mexico and California and westward to Hawaii and islands in the South Pacific. Similarly, in 1822 the Navy established the West India Station, whose area of operations included the Caribbean and, in 1826, it set up the Brazilian or South Atlantic Squadron. Thus by the end of Latin America's wars of independence the United States had three naval stations in that area; in all the rest of the world at that time it had only one other station, in the Mediterranean.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Most important, because it was most lasting, was the impact of the Latin American wars on United States policy. This impact was reflected in the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated in President Monroe's annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. While maintaining the government's posture of neutrality and peace under the existing circumstances, the Monroe Doctrine warned that under certain other conditions the United States would go to war. The warning was contained in the second of the doctrine's two main parts. The first part, which related to the entire Western Hemisphere, asserted that the "American continents" were not open to

further colonization by any non-American power. The second part, which dealt with Latin America alone, warned that the United States would regard as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition and as "dangerous to our peace and safety" any effort on the part of the European powers to impose their "system" upon the new states of Latin America whose independence the United States had recognized, or to oppress or control them in any other manner. In the international parlance of that day, the use of such terms as "unfriendly disposition" and "dangerous to our peace and safety" constituted a warning that the United States would go to war if the European powers failed to leave the new Latin American states alone.

This was Monroe's famous "challenge to Europe." Yet it was not a challenge to all Europe and it was not a call to arms. Geographically, it confined the mantle of United States protection to the new states already recognized by Washington. Even in their case, it maintained existing neutrality policy, in the sense that the United States would remain neutral in the wars of independence so long as the former mother country, Spain, was not aided by another power (as Spain never was). The challenge to Europe was further tempered by the assurance that "we have not interfered and shall not interfere" with "the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power"—a reference to the American colonies that were not in a state of revolt, such as those of Great Britain and France in the West Indies.

Finally, the Monroe Doctrine was a strictly unilateral declaration of national policy. Made without consulting the new states, it contained no commitment to them and carried no suggestion of an alliance with them. It left the United States free to interpret and to apply or not apply the doctrine as it saw fit, in the light of its own conception of its national interests.

The doctrine reflects Monroe's prudent restraint: he was careful to avoid even the appearance of arraying a united America against the united great powers of Europe, for he knew well that in such a confrontation Eu-

rope's superior power would be overwhelming. But another strand of motivation persisted long after the balance of power had been altered in favor of the United States, namely, the United States government's determination to retain a free hand. This determination had already been expressed—with primary reference to Europe—in George Washington's Farewell Address and in Thomas Jefferson's "no entangling alliances" pronouncement. Now it was applied specifically to Latin America, the first area of the world, after Europe, with which the United States developed important ties. To be sure, Latin America was placed on a different footing from Europe in United States policy, for the Monroe Doctrine expressed the partly mystical, partly pragmatic "Western Hemisphere idea"—the idea that the nations of the New World were bound together in an American system that set them apart from the Old World.

The seeds of Pan Americanism can thus be found in the Monroe Doctrine, but they were slow to sprout. As interpreted to 1933 (except for Woodrow Wilson's Pan American Pact), the doctrine was no more notable for its "hands off" warning to Europe than for its assertion of a free hand for the United States—above all in security matters involving military action. One reason for this attitude was given in 1821 by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. Explaining his opposition to proposals that the United States join Britain and the Latin Americans in repelling aggressions by the Holy Alliance, Adams declared that "a direct interference in foreign wars, even wars of freedom," would have an "inevitable tendency . . . to change the very foundations of our own government from liberty to power."

MANIFEST DESTINY AND WAR WITH MEXICO

Adams adhered to this view during his presidency (1825–1829), but in the two decades that followed, the inhibition against the use of military force beyond the national borders was overwhelmed by an expansionist movement that reached its peak in the 1840's,

mainly at the expense of Mexico, under the label "Manifest Destiny." This was a new phase of an old movement that had led to the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, to unsuccessful efforts in the War of 1812 to conquer Spanish Florida and Canada, and to the treaty of 1819 with Spain, whereby the United States obtained not only Florida but also Spain's claim to the Oregon country, while giving up its own claim to Texas. A few years later, Mexico won her independence from Spain and inherited the Spanish title to Texas, New Mexico and California. About the same time, Russia ceded to the United States her claim to the Pacific Northwest south of Alaska at parallel 54° 40'.

As a result, only Mexico (in the west and southwest) and Britain (in the northwest) now stood in the way of that expansion of the United States to the Pacific which was demanded by the rising spirit of Manifest Destiny. More than a slogan, Manifest Destiny expressed an idea—the idea that it was the destiny of the United States to extend the area of freedom westward to the natural limit set by the Pacific Ocean.

The climactic stage of this expansionist movement began with the victory of the Democratic party in the presidential election of 1844 on a platform calling for "the reannexation of Texas and the reoccupation of Oregon"—"reannexation" because the United States had claimed Texas as part of the Louisiana Purchase until it surrendered the claim in the treaty of 1819, and "reoccupation" because, under United States auspices, John Jacob Astor had established a fur trading post in the Oregon country in 1811 and maintained it until it was seized by the British in the War of 1812.

Another slogan of this campaign, "fifty-four forty or fight," obviously pointed to Oregon, but the main thrust of expansionism was toward Texas. American immigrants, settled there since the 1820's with Mexico's consent, rebelled in 1835 against the Mexican government's newly adopted centralizing and anti-slavery policy. Setting up the independent Republic of Texas, they defeated the Mexican forces sent to subdue them. For sev-

eral years the Lone Star State remained independent and even flirted with Great Britain and France, which, like the United States, had promptly recognized its independence. But by 1844 assorted troubles were multiplying and the Texans were ready for annexation to the United States. After the election of that year, the United States was ready too. Annexation was strongly opposed in the United States by anti-expansionists and anti-slavery leaders who charged it was the work of Southern "slavocracy" and was aimed at extending the area of slavery. Their opposition was overborne and in 1845 Texas was annexed.

The newly elected President, James K. Polk, a Tennessee slaveowner and an expansionist, made the most of the ensuing controversy with Mexico. Unintentionally, the Mexican authorities helped him by maintaining an attitude that was not only intransigent but bellicose. Rejecting the advice of their British friends who urged them to recognize the independence of Texas as a fact of life, the Mexicans asserted that the annexation of Texas by the United States would be a just cause for war. When it was annexed, they severed diplomatic relations and repulsed Polk's efforts to reopen relations. Finally, when Polk sent 3,500 United States troops to patrol the northern bank of the Rio Grande—the extreme limit of the territory claimed by Texas and hence, after its annexation, by the United States—the Mexican government sent a force nearly twice as large to confront it. Part of this Mexican force crossed to the northern bank, ambushed a United States cavalry detachment and killed several of its members on April 24, 1846. A few days later, the main Mexican force crossed to attack the Americans and two battles followed in quick succession. The Mexicans were defeated in both, but Polk had what he wanted—sufficient grounds for asking Congress to recognize that a state of war with Mexico existed by the act of Mexico herself. In this form, Congress declared war on May 13, 1846.

The war that followed was the only major military involvement of the United States in Latin America before its war of 1898 with

Spain over Cuba. As was usual in those days, the United States was ill prepared to fight. The 3,500 soldiers sent to the border on the eve of the war were two-thirds of the entire United States Army at that time. Yet within 16 months the Americans had fought their way over mountain passes 10,000 feet high to the heart of Mexico and were in possession of Mexico City, the country's national capital and metropolis. There they dictated the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in February, 1848, in which Mexico recognized the United States title to Texas and sold it New Mexico and California.

The victory of the United States was not due to superior numbers, for while its forces were greatly augmented after the outbreak of hostilities, the Mexicans outnumbered the Americans by a substantial margin in almost every action up to the very end. Nor, on the other hand, was the Mexicans' defeat due to a lack of courage and devotion or skills of certain kinds. Rather, the United States won because of superior leadership, organization and materiel—in other words, because it was more highly developed than Mexico. Its artillery, for example, was far superior to the Mexicans', and brilliant service was rendered by junior officers recently trained at West Point, many of whom, including Ulysses Grant, William Sherman, George Thomas, Robert E. Lee, James Longstreet, and Thomas Jackson, were later to win fame in the United States Civil War. The top leadership, too, as represented by General Winfield Scott (an earlier graduate and former superintendent of West Point) was excellent; and it is interesting to learn that in a crucial operation as he fought his way up to Mexico City, one of Scott's most daring and successful actions was probably inspired in part by the example of the Spanish conquistador Hernando Cortés, as described in Prescott's *The Conquest of Mexico*, published in 1843.

INTERVENTION, NEW STYLE

After the 1853 Gadsden Purchase of another slice of Mexican territory, expansion as well as military involvement in the Latin American area ceased until the 1890's. Then

a resurgence of Manifest Destiny began in a new form. President Grover Cleveland, though not an expansionist, strongly reasserted the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary controversy with Britain in 1895-1896. The British finally gave in, thereby opening a new era; from that time forth they generally deferred to the United States in Latin American affairs involving its security.

In its more positive aspects, the best exponents of the new Manifest Destiny were young Republicans like Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert J. Beveridge. A chief source of their ideas was the work of A. T. Mahan on the decisive influence of sea power and on the need for overseas bases and an isthmian canal. Another source was Europe's new imperialism, which served both as an example—for the United States had now become potentially a great power—and as a warning that Latin America might fall under European control (as had most of Africa and much of Asia) if the United States did not bestir itself. Considerations such as these helped to usher in another period of expansion and military involvement in Latin America, in which the United States still kept a free hand.

The first step was the armed intervention of the United States against Spain in 1898 in Cuba's war for independence—a war that had been dragging on since 1895. In the "war message" that precipitated the intervention, President William McKinley laid heavy stress on the national interests of the United States, particularly its right to use force to end the apparently interminable conflict between Cubans and Spaniards in a country so close to the United States. He declared that the conflict was doing great injury to the United States by spreading disease, ruining trade, and compelling the United States government to go to great expense for the enforcement of its neutrality and the protection of its citizens.

Again, as in the Venezuelan boundary case, the United States acted unilaterally. Although by the Teller Amendment, adopted just after the intervention began, it committed itself to the independence of Cuba, it did not

recognize any independent Cuban government, nor did it consult with the Latin American governments about Cuba. Similarly Washington kept an entirely free hand both in the operation of its military and naval forces during the war and also in the Treaty of Paris (1899) by which Spain gave up Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the Philippines as well, to the United States.

The United States maintained a military occupation of Cuba until 1902, and the Cubans then obtained a measure of independence only in return for incorporating both in their constitution and in a permanent treaty with the United States the terms of the Platt Amendment (named for its original form, an amendment, offered by Senator Platt, to an army appropriation bill). This made Cuba a virtual protectorate of the United States, for it gave the latter the right to intervene in Cuba and placed other restrictions on Cuban sovereignty. It also gave the United States the right to establish naval bases in Cuba. The only one actually established was at Guantánamo, which the United States retained after the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934—and still keeps.

The Cuban treaty of 1902 was the starting point of a rapidly spreading process of United States intervention in the Caribbean, which continued until the 1930's. The second step came in Panama in November, 1903. Indignant over the rejection by Colombia (of which Panama was a part) of a treaty that would have given the United States the right to build an interoceanic canal through the isthmus, the Panamanians staged a revolt and won it handily with the aid of United States warships. Before the month was out, the new Republic of Panama concluded a treaty with the United States that gave the United States the right not only to build a canal and exercise sovereign power in the canal zone but also to intervene in the Republic of Panama.

The last and longest step in the spreading process was taken in December, 1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt asserted his government's right to interfere—temporarily, but at its own discretion—in any Western Hemisphere country for the correction of sit-

uations brought about by the "chronic wrong-doing" of irresponsible governments and the collapse of public order. This proposition became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine because Roosevelt based it on the ground that such intervention was authorized by general international law (as in fact it was at that time), and that under the Monroe Doctrine intervention could not be carried out in the Western Hemisphere by a non-American power and hence devolved upon the United States.

"PROTECTIVE IMPERIALISM"

This new policy was called "protective imperialism." It resulted from a reaction against an armed intervention in Venezuela in 1902 and 1903 by Germany and Great Britain, and it was ostensibly designed to protect weak Latin American states, by temporary United States intervention, against European imperialism operating through interventions that might become permanent. The Latin Americans, however, naturally resented the United States' arrogation to itself of the right to police the Western Hemisphere; their resentment developed slowly as the policy was put into practice, with some deplorable consequences. Though the interventions were confined to a few small and particularly disorderly states in the Caribbean, and though the Roosevelt Corollary was disavowed by the Clark Memorandum, published by the State Department in 1930, Latin American ire over the issue remained unappeased.

Only the sketchiest account of these interventions can be given here. Those in Cuba and Panama will be omitted, since they took place under the treaties already mentioned.

The first intervention under the Roosevelt Corollary took place in the Dominican Republic in 1905; though it was only fiscal at the start, it had protective implications since it was designed to forestall European intervention. Nicaragua came next, in 1911. In this case fiscal intervention soon developed into armed intervention, which continued off and on through the next two decades, part of the time in the guise of a "Legation Guard" (a

guard for the United States Legation in the capital city, Managua).

The deepest interventions took place in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in 1915 and 1916 respectively. In these cases there was virtually total military occupation; even when a Haitian retained the titular presidency, for example, he had a United States naval officer as his minister of foreign affairs. There was much bloodshed in Haiti, due mainly to a revolt by the *cacos* or peasant guerrillas. From 1915 to 1920, according to the general in command of the United States Marines, his forces killed 2,250 Haitians, "mostly in battle," while in the same period Marine casualties were 13 killed and 28 wounded. In both countries, as in Nicaragua, United States financial and business interests were involved in the interventions, and this gave rise to the widespread conviction that protective imperialism was aimed primarily at protecting and promoting United States economic interests in Latin America.

In addition, from 1914 to 1916, the armed forces of the United States clashed with Mexican forces on several occasions. The principal clashes took place at the seaports of Tampico and Vera Cruz and in northern Mexico, where troops under General John Pershing vainly pursued Pancho Villa after his bloody raid on Columbus, New Mexico. But these forays were of relatively brief duration, and they neither developed into military occupations nor led to war.

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"The seeds of this country's massive military involvement in Latin America in the 1950's and 1960's were sown during the Good Neighbor period."

The Era of the Good Neighbor

BY GEORGE W. GRAYSON, JR.

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IN HIS INAUGURAL speech of March 4, 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt departed long enough from domestic concerns to articulate a basic precept of his foreign policy:*

In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself, and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.

The following month, in a Pan American Day message, the President made it clear that the above principle was to apply specifically to the Western Hemisphere:

The essential qualities of a true Pan Americanism must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, namely, mutual understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the others' point of view. It is only in this manner that we can hope to build up a system of which confidence, friendship and good will are the cornerstones.

The Good Neighbor policy was thus enun-

* For research and typing assistance, I wish to express my appreciation to Betty Orr and Barbara Batson.

¹ The term "Good Neighbor" was employed long before Roosevelt gave it currency. Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes, Herbert Hoover and other Republicans had used it, and the phrase appeared, apparently at the instance of Mexico's Commissioners, in the preamble to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which concluded the Mexican-American war. See Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1961), p. 124.

² Wood argues that three policies—"nonintervention," "noninterference," and "reciprocity"—made up good neighborism. See *ibid.*, *passim*.

ciated.¹ A Madison Avenue advertising executive could not have asked for a better product. The Golden Rule, warm handshakes, mutual concern, sincere cooperation—these are images which fly to mind when one speaks of good neighbors. Not since President James Monroe recognized their independence had a United States President professed such warm regard for the Latin American republics. Not until the mellifluous pronouncements of President John Kennedy's administration would such attention again be manifest. The rhetorical fanfare notwithstanding, Roosevelt's policy—some say policies²—toward the hemispheric nations was (1) essentially negative, with a few exceptions, (2) largely unilateral, despite lavish references to multilateralism, and (3) the genesis of a significant United States military involvement with the nations of the Americas. Above all, good neighborism was aimed at furthering the immediate interests of the United States, namely, trade expansion and the security of the Hemisphere against Axis aggression and subversion.

A NEGATIVE POLICY

To be a good neighbor, the United States would have to lay aside the "big stick" which the President's cousin Teddy (President Theodore Roosevelt) had fashioned for handling unruly Latin American states. As early as 1928, Franklin Roosevelt had insisted that: "Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other nations must end; with

the cooperation of others we shall have more order in this Hemisphere and less dislike."³ This idea found its way into the 1932 Democratic platform which called for "no interference in the internal affairs of other nations. . . ."

By the time Roosevelt entered the White House, intervention no longer constituted an efficient instrument for dealing with republics south of the Río Grande. Although private United States firms occasionally benefited, sending Marines abroad was expensive, and democratic governments failed to blossom in their wake as President Woodrow Wilson had hoped. Ill will sprang up instead. The supremacy of the United States in the region was now unchallenged: war and economic collapse constrained extra-continental expansion by European nations, and major Latin American states—Argentina and Brazil, for example—were trapped in the vortex of the great depression. In the Caribbean, domestic guardians of order had been groomed: the *Guardia Nacional* of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo's army in the Dominican Republic, and the Haitian constabulary under the political control of Sténio Vicent. How could Washington voice moral indignation at Japanese imperialism if the United States were dispatching troops to the Americas?

An opportunity to jettison this bankrupt policy soon emerged. In December, 1933, representatives from the American republics converged on Montevideo for the Seventh International Conference of American States. There the *latinos* planned to find out whether Roosevelt's Good Neighbor talk was substance or shadow. Specifically, the delegates considered a Convention of the Rights and Duties of States, Article VIII of which stated that: "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." Article XI contained the provision that: "The territory of a State is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of

³ "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (July, 1928), p. 585.

⁴ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1967), p. 274.

other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever, even temporarily."

Secretary of State Cordell Hull, chief of the United States delegation, ardently desired clarification of the convention's language. Rather than give the appearance of hedging, however, he signed the document with the stipulation that the United States reserved its rights by "the law of nations as generally recognized."⁴ Whereas President Herbert Hoover had expressed disenchantment with military intervention, the Roosevelt administration renounced such action, a position reiterated three years later at the Buenos Aires conference.

Cuba provided the first trial of the non-intervention principle. President Gerardo Machado, legally elected in 1925, altered the constitution three years later to extend his term of office. As resistance snowballed, the dictator resorted to Gestapo-like suppression and lawlessness swept the country. What should the United States do? Didn't the 1901 Platt Amendment authorize intervention "for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for protection of life, property, and individual liberty. . . .?" Despite mounting pressures—Ambassador Sumner Welles three times urged Roosevelt to send in a military force—Washington eschewed armed intervention. Not only were troops withheld, but the Platt Amendment was abrogated in 1934, although Washington held fast to its Guantánamo base.

Military inaction did not mean that the United States avoided interference in Cuban affairs. To the contrary, Ambassador Welles coaxed, cajoled and hectored Machado to vacate the presidency. When the dictator finally fled, Welles persuaded the State Department to withhold recognition from a new regime headed by Ramón Grau San Martín, a fiery social reformer who urged land reform, higher wages, shorter working days and increased taxes on foreign holdings. This pressure, accompanied by the presence of 30 United States warships off the Cuban coast, hastened Grau's overthrow, and Washington

speedily recognized the new government headed by a puppet of army boss Fulgencio Batista, whom Welles described as an "extraordinarily brilliant and able figure." For the United States ambassador, this regime represented "the first step in the long process of Cuba's return to constitutional government, economic prosperity, and normal social stability."⁵

Still, the real test of non-interventionism occurred in Mexico. In 1938, President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated the holdings of foreign oil companies which opposed a labor settlement decreed by the Mexican Supreme Court. United States firms valued (perhaps extravagantly) at \$260 million numbered among the properties seized. At no time did the State Department contest the expropriation rights of a sovereign government. What concerned Washington was that, in accordance with international law, prompt, adequate and effective compensation must be made. The oil companies howled in anger at Mexico's move and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, his "Tennessee temper" boiling, referred privately to Cárdenas and his associates as "Communists,"⁶ but the cool diplomacy of Ambassador Josephus Daniels rejected highhanded bullying, preserved diplomatic relations and paved the way for an understanding. Though the Mexican government suffered harassment,⁷ a peaceful solution was reached whereby a joint commission of experts decided upon

fair compensation for the United States companies. Two important factors motivated Washington to press for an amicable settlement: fear of antagonizing the country which flanked this nation's southern border, and alarm at the growing interest of Germany, Japan and Italy in Mexican petroleum. Thus the episode revealed an emerging tenet of good neighborism, e.g., that United States national interests would henceforth supersede those of private firms.

Other examples of Roosevelt's non-interventionism are readily found. The final detachment of Marines left Nicaragua in 1933, and the following year the President ordered them out of Haiti, which they had occupied for 19 years. For the first time since 1915, no United States troops were stationed in Latin America (and none intervened there until President Johnson dispatched the Marines to the Dominican Republic in 1965). Under the 1936 Hull-Alfaro Treaty, ratified in 1939, the United States foreswore its "right to intervene" in Panama, though the canal remained under United States control. The 1937 seizure by the Bolivian government of Standard Oil Company holdings was settled through diplomacy and economic enticements, not by armed force, and by 1941 the United States had ceased collecting customs in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

All of these cases underscore the negative character of good neighborism. The United States was saying, in effect, that it would *not* send troops to collect debts; it would *not* seize customs houses; it would *not* intervene militarily in political affairs; it would *not* rush to the rescue of private United States firms.

On the positive side, the Roosevelt administration sought to boost trade to pull the country from the depths of the Great Depression. Secretary Hull, architect of the program, proposed bilateral trade liberalization to the 1933 Montevideo conference. The following year Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which authorized the President to negotiate tariff cuts of up to 50 per cent with countries prepared to reciprocate. The reductions, based on the extremely high schedules set by the 1930 Smoot-

⁵ By rather opaque reasoning, the ambassador argued that the U. S. government would have been "derelict in its obligations to the Cuban people" in recognizing the unpopular and "disastrously incompetent" Grau regime; see Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 196-199. An excellent discussion of this episode is offered by E. David Cronon, "Interpreting the New Good Neighbor Policy: The Cuban Crisis of 1933," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, November, 1959, pp. 538-567.

⁶ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁷ The U. S. Treasury temporarily suspended purchases of Mexican silver and the State Department supported a boycott of Mexican oil. See Lloyd C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 116. U. S. Government lending agencies made no loans to Mexico between August, 1937, and November, 1941. See Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

Hawley tariff, failed to tumble the high wall encircling the United States market, and protectionism persisted in Latin America. Nevertheless, United States-Latin American trade shot up 302 per cent between 1933 and 1942. The value of United States exports to the Hemisphere increased from \$244 million to \$871 million, while United States imports from Latin American nations expanded from \$335 million to \$1,045 million. In spite of the oil controversy, imports from Mexico increased from \$31 million to \$124 million, and United States exports to its southern neighbor rose from \$38 million to \$148 million in the ten-year period.⁸

To spur trade, Congress in 1934 created the Export-Import Bank, which made a number of loans to United States exporters operating in Latin America. Once war broke out, the bank became an important supplier of credit to hemispheric governments. It also assumed a political role. The multi-million dollar Volta Redonda steel complex, the bank's most dramatic project, was undertaken to preempt Brazil's steel industry from German and Japanese interests. Similarly, other credits helped to circumscribe Axis influence in the Americas. The bank initiated United States foreign aid to Latin America, which has continued under Point IV and the Alliance for Progress.

UNILATERAL POLICY

During the 1930's, United States representatives turned the air blue with talk of the Good Neighbor policy's multilateral character. Alarmed by the aggressive posture of Benito Mussolini and Adolph Hitler, Roosevelt sought hemispheric unity against possible European threats to the New World. In personal letters to the heads of Latin American states, he invited them to send delegations to an extraordinary inter-American conference, convened in Buenos Aires in December, 1936.

⁸ U. S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 550, 552. These figures are not corrected for changes in the price level.

⁹ Edwin Lieuwen, *U. S. Policy in Latin America* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 72.

Despite his crippled condition which required a heavy steel brace, the President voyaged 7,000 miles to attend this special meeting. In an opening speech, he stressed the importance of social and political justice in the Hemisphere, extolled the equality of the American states, and emphasized the need to maintain peace.

The diplomatic adroitness of Argentine Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas, convinced that his country's interests lay principally with Europe, not the Americas, prevented the creation of machinery for joint action; however, the delegates adopted a "Consultative Pact," which called for consultation among the American states in the event of direct or indirect threats to hemispheric security. Another article, unanimously adopted, stipulated that "every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every American republic and justifies the initiation of the procedural consultation provided for . . ." According to one scholar, this agreement constituted the "Pan-Americanization of the Monroe Doctrine."⁹ In truth, this "Pan-Americanization" received only lip-service.

Representatives to the Eighth International Conference of American States, meeting in Lima three months after the September, 1938, Munich debacle, continued this verbal co-operation. They unanimously approved the "Declaration of Lima," which reiterated support both for hemispheric solidarity and for consultation in the face of outside dangers. Though opposition from Argentina chilled United States efforts to forge a front against totalitarian expansion and Nazi-Fascist subversion, Secretary Hull settled for an agreement that all the foreign ministers would "meet upon the call of any one of them."

This machinery soon spun into action. In the aftermath of Germany's rape of Poland in September, 1939, the American foreign ministers gathered in Panama. There they proclaimed a "safety belt" around the Americas south of belligerent Canada, ranging from 300 to 1,000 miles in width. The foreign ministers thus warned the European combatants to steer clear of the Western

Hemisphere, an act nearly as brazen as the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine over a century before. The American republics were seeking to avoid war, but they lacked the collective means or will to enforce their neutrality zone. (A flagrant violation of this zone, sometimes derisively called a "chastity belt," occurred when British warships attacked the *Graf von Spee*, a German "pocket" battleship, off the Uruguayan coast.)

Two permanent standing committees emerged from the Panama conference: the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, which initiated a study of financial and economic matters affecting the interests of the hemispheric states; and the Inter-American Neutrality Committee, which attempted to devise a code of conduct for the neutral American nations.

Following the *Wehrmacht's* onslaught into West Europe, the foreign ministers assembled in Havana to decide the status of French and Dutch colonies in the Western Hemisphere after Hitler had overrun their mother countries. The upshot was the "Act of Havana," which asserted that one or more American republics would temporarily administer colonies that were in danger of changing hands, until their previous status or independence was attained. Though a convention embodying its principles was ratified by two-thirds of the signatory states early in 1942, the Act of Havana was never invoked. The Havana conference also adopted a reciprocal assistance declaration providing that an attack by a non-American state on any hemispheric republic would be treated as an attack on all and joint consultation would begin immediately.

Inter-American meetings from Buenos Aires to Havana evidenced increasing United States-Latin American cooperation. Despite frequent allusions to multilateralism, however, responsibility for implementing policies adopted at these sessions rested with Washington. What country had armed forces suf-

ficiently powerful to threaten retaliation against European incursions into the Hemisphere? Whose navy could patrol the seas that washed the American republics? Who was strong enough to take control of European colonies—in the face of an Axis threat—and administer them for the duration of hostilities? In every case, the answer was clear—the United States.

The United States military never seriously considered multilateral defense of the Hemisphere. A Joint Planning Committee of the Army and Navy prepared a series of in-depth reports on the alternative responses this country could make to a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Called the "Rainbow Plans," these studies assigned primary defense responsibilities to United States forces in the event of an Axis attack. The Latin American nations were relegated to a minor supporting role because of their low military capability.¹⁰

Following the collapse of France, United States military officers entered into extended conversations with their Latin American counterparts. These so-called "Staff Agreements" concerned American access to land, sea, and air bases in the Hemisphere. The American representatives impressed upon the Latins that they were to hold off external aggressors until United States forces could rush to the rescue. The Latin Americans were not allies, in the sense that they would share decision-making on defense questions, as seen in the commitment they would have to make for United States aid:

1. To call on the United States for armed assistance in event of actual or threatened attack.
2. To report to the United States any non-American attack.
3. To explain, via radio, to the rest of the world, and especially to Latin America, the reason for a request of United States assistance.
4. To permit the transit of United States forces going to the aid of a neighbor.
5. To develop and maintain an effective and complete interchange of intelligence relating to continental security.
6. To develop and maintain an adequate and efficient secret service in order to keep under surveillance aliens and subversive groups.
7. To eliminate anti-United States propaganda in terms of emergency.¹¹

¹⁰ J. Lloyd Mecham, *A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 132.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

GROUNDWORK FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The seeds of this country's massive military involvement in Latin America in the 1950's and 1960's were sown during the Good Neighbor period. On May 19, 1926, Congress passed an enabling act permitting officers of the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps to assist certain Hemisphere governments in military and naval matters.¹² Taking advantage of this legislation, the Roosevelt administration concluded a number of "Military Mission Agreements" with South and Central American countries. The President was anxious to send missions to Latin America to prepare local officers for hemispheric defense and to offset the influence of Germans and Italians, long involved in training Latin American armies, who intermingled Nazi and Fascist propaganda with their instruction.

A pact establishing a United States mission in Brazil typified these bilateral accords. Negotiated for a two-year period and subject to extension, this agreement called for five United States officers to set up a coast artillery instruction center, to formulate the curriculum and to assist in teaching. This mission would also lend a hand to the military's technical school in courses dealing with fortification, ordnance and chemical warfare. The Brazilian government, which agreed to pay the salaries of the United States personnel, pledged not to engage "any Mission or personnel of any foreign government" for the project undertaken by the Americans as long as the pact remained in effect.

These and similar accords enabled the

¹² This legislation was required to overcome the prohibition set forth in the last paragraph of Article I, Section 9, of the U. S. Constitution, which reads:

"No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State."

See S. S. Jones and D. P. Myers, *Documents on Foreign Policy* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1939), p. 59.

¹³ Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (Rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 191.

United States to supplant Italy and Germany in advising Latin American armies (United States Naval missions replaced those of France and England in training hemispheric navies). In November, 1938, nine United States, four German and eleven Italian missions were operating in Central and South America. Three years later not a single German or Italian advisory unit remained, and the United States boasted air, naval or army groups in nearly every Latin American country. One reason for this shift was Washington's readiness to underbid its Axis rivals and offer quality technical assistance at bargain basement prices.¹³ Latin Americans were also invited, in increasing numbers, to study at West Point, Annapolis and other special military schools in this country. Today, as an outgrowth of its efforts in the 1930's, the United States maintains Military Advisory Assistance Groups in a dozen Hemisphere republics, shores up the Inter-American Defense Board, directs the Inter-American War College, and annually trains hundreds of Latin officers and prospective officers.

Military materiel flowed into the Hemisphere on the heels of United States advisors. Senate haggling over payments delayed sending obsolete surplus weapons to Latin America, as requested by the War, Navy and State Departments. However, the 1941 passage of the Lend Lease bill, symbolically numbered 1776, furnished a means of making munitions available to allies.

Washington sought bases in exchange for its missions and aid. The War Department expressed special concern over protecting the Brazilian "hump," fearing that Hitler might leap from Dakar onto the back of the sleeping Portuguese-speaking giant. In addition,

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"Despite the diplomatic commitments of 1939 and 1940 (and even of 1942) to hemispheric defense, it was difficult for the United States to negotiate with Latin Americans for military collaboration. Some United States officials frankly considered Latin attitudes a nuisance. . . . [and] Latin suspicion of United States motives had scarcely been allayed for most Latins by a single decade of good neighborliness."

Hemispheric Defense in World War II

BY PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR.
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UNITED STATES POLICY toward Latin America underwent great change in the decade prior to the beginning of World War II.

The improved mood, coupled with wartime conditions, created near unanimity when the need arose. At the Buenos Aires special inter-American meeting of 1936 and the 8th Inter-American Conference at Lima in 1938, the great majority of the Latin American countries had begun to shake off their skepticism of United States intentions and to adopt the initiatives proposed by the United States. More had been sought, of course: a firm commitment to united action by all in case of any attack on a Western Hemisphere country. But the two meetings paved the way for a consultation by the foreign ministers that would look toward joint action against aggressors, and toward mutual economic and military assistance under the terms of what became a *de facto* if not a *de jure* alliance.

The concern of this article is the nature of the diplomatic and military collaboration that prevailed during the war. The three meetings of the foreign ministers (at Panama in 1939; at Havana in 1940; and at Rio de Janeiro in 1942) were partially symbolic, partially practical. They declared the concern of the American countries with the war's threat to the peace of the entire world, and tried to prevent its spread to the Western

Hemisphere. As war spread despite all efforts, the American countries tried to minimize its effects upon themselves. Finally, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, the great majority adopted measures for the common defense. They took the necessary diplomatic steps to forge the maximum possible political unity. And they collaborated militarily, sometimes to the extent of becoming comrades in arms. The key purpose of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823—the defense of the United States within the Hemisphere—was broadened to include the mutual defense of the entire Hemisphere.

Diplomatic relationships within the Hemisphere during the war reflected many problems. During most of the period from 1939 to 1945, regional security required collaboration with a degree of intimacy never before conceived. The decade of good neighborliness, coupled with the charismatic personality of Franklin Roosevelt, led some Latin American countries to feel that they could overlook the record of United States dominance and could anticipate a more congenial future. Yet Argentine resentment of the United States presence, and doubt of United States good faith in evaluating the rise of Hitler's dictatorship in Germany, led Argentina to reject this rapprochement. Some United States diplomats interpreted the Argentine attitude as a mixture of nationalism,

fascism and opportunism in international politics, based on authoritarianism—civilian in nature from 1941 to 1943, and military thereafter—in national politics. The antagonism was very embarrassing for other countries. Before a weak *modus vivendi* had been developed at Chapultepec it had brought the wartime diplomatic collaboration of the Americas nearly to the point of breakdown.

There had been several issues at both the Buenos Aires meeting in 1936 and the Lima conference in 1938. The first conference approved two principal agreements to compromise the conflicting Argentine and United States positions. There would be a total prohibition of intervention in the internal or external affairs of another American country by any one of them, with consultation looking toward a search for peaceful adjustments should this occur. Should there be any menace to the peace of the Hemisphere from outside forces, consultation would seek ways to preserve hemispheric peace. The Lima meeting again revealed some aspects of the binational conflict. It convened in December, 1938, only a few months after Germany's seizure of Austria and portions of Czechoslovakia made war inevitable. It adopted a statement that consultation by the foreign ministers or their deputies would take place in case "the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American Republic" were threatened by any source. In substance, the second meeting resolved the diplomatic question by adopting the United States position toward security and planning.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The first American foreign ministers' meeting during World War II convened at Panama on September 23, 1939, three weeks after the invasion of Poland. By this time the United States Congress had begun action to rescind the rigid neutrality laws that precluded United States aid to the endangered democracies. The Final Act of the Panama meeting, signed on October 3, 1939, thoroughly revised the neutrality policies of the signatories, and helped to make possible the extension of material aid to the British and

French governments. It announced a zone—averaging about 300 miles from the coastlines around the two continents south of the Canadian border—within which hostilities would not be permitted; the signatories claimed an "inherent right" to be exempted from hostile acts by "any non-American belligerent nation. . . ." It provided that consultation should occur if any European colony in the Western Hemisphere were "obliged to change its sovereignty." Barring more immediate need, it called for a second meeting of foreign ministers for Havana on October 1, 1940.

The Havana meeting convened on July 21, 1940; before the date fixed, France and the lowland countries had collapsed and Britain stood alone. The meeting adopted a wide variety of commercial, legal and subversive control measures. Some of these established bases for strategic materials procurement by the United States during the war. However, the meeting's primary work was the defense of the Hemisphere, including the possessions of the occupied European countries. In Declaration 15, the participants voted to consider an act of aggression against one country to be an act of aggression against all, and provided that any two or more countries might develop mutual assistance understandings. It adopted a plainly stated resolution that no transfer of sovereignty of the possession of a defeated power would be recognized, and it suggested that any such attempt would cause united Hemisphere action to preclude it. Declaration 20 of the meeting, the Act of Havana, stated that any such transfer might cause the territories involved to become "strategic centers of aggression," and that it would be resisted by possible joint occupation and the establishment of a provisional government. This declaration was supported by the understanding that, pending the ratification of the declaration, should emergency action for the defense of any one or more of the American countries become necessary, the country most involved and best able to act could do so. An emergency committee of the inter-American system would take cognizance and respond as needed.

Declarations 15 and 20 of Havana provided the diplomatic bases for bilateral defense commissions, as well as for extension of lend-lease military facilities and arms to selected Latin American countries. Even before Pearl Harbor, Mexico and the United States had begun to develop joint defense plans, and lend-lease¹ arrangements were concluded with eight countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Guatemala. Before the end of 1942, these facilities had been extended to all Latin American countries except Argentina and Chile. On the basis of these agreements, when the United States obtained the use of British and Danish possessions as military bases, it announced that all the American countries would have equal access. In November, 1941, with Dutch permission, the United States and Brazil jointly occupied Dutch Guiana, in order to preclude its use by the Axis as a "center of aggression."

The final step toward full alliance came after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. Of the 12 Latin American countries in or facing on the Caribbean, three countries broke relations with the Axis powers and nine countries declared war immediately. Others granted belligerent rights to United States naval vessels in their harbors. The Rio de Janeiro meeting of January 15-28, 1942, completed the structure for the cooperation of the American countries during World War II.

The declarations that reaffirmed the political solidarity of the inter-American system received much attention. The continuance and amplification of economic and legal cooperation during the war was equally important, however. To coordinate measures to prevent subversion, the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense (E.A.C.P.D.) was organized. To coordinate and plan joint military and technical matters for Hemisphere defense the Inter-American Defense

Board was established. The signatories declared their support for the establishment of a United Nations during the war, and supported a universal postwar United Nations Organization. But while there was unanimous mild support for breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, the opposition of Chile and Argentina prevented the adoption of a stronger declaration on that subject.

During the period of actual warfare involving the American countries, there were a few diplomatic problems that involved the E.A.C.P.D. Chile had some grounds for professing fear for her safety; the apparent collapse of United States naval power at Pearl Harbor suggested that abandonment of neutrality toward the Axis could be very costly. Chile finally broke relations with the Axis on January 29, 1943, but only after harsh United States criticism, supported by the E.A.C.P.D.'s publicizing of evidence of Axis spying on the Hemisphere from Chile under cover of diplomatic immunity.

The Argentine problem was far more difficult. The Argentine attitude from 1938 to 1942 was marked by isolationism, harking back to Argentina's neutrality during World War I. The rise to power in June, 1943, of a pro-Axis clique within the Army changed the country's policy to one of open friendship with Germany. This did not prevent Argentine diplomats from demanding lend-lease military equipment from the United States; however. Argentine delegates in the E.A.C.P.D. insisted on participating in committee activities until their government's subversion of the committee's purposes caused members to insist that they withdraw.

Exchanges with the United States became very tense; the other American countries reacted with some exasperation to abrupt and occasionally cavalier United States demands that they follow the unilateral anti-Argentine acts of the United States. Argentina's breaking of diplomatic relations with the Axis on January 26, 1944, was meaningless, since her military leaders did not abandon their rejection of the attitudes of the other American countries until after Germany collapsed in May, 1945. The breach with the United

¹ Lend-lease was the term used to describe the United States sale, transfer, lease or loan of necessary war supplies (equipment, machinery or services) to countries associated with the United States in the war effort. The President had discretion concerning repayment (cash, goods or services). The law became effective in March, 1941; it was terminated on August 21, 1945.

States was only partially healed before the Chapultepec meeting of 1945, and then only because of compromise by both parties and the active mediation of several other Latin American countries.

The E.A.C.P.D. also examined the Bolivian coup d'état of December 20, 1943. Evidence was found linking the new government to pro-Nazi groups, and the E.A.C.P.D. recommended that the American countries withhold diplomatic recognition. The Argentine government had already recognized the new regime, and criticized the recommendation sharply. The Bolivian government made a number of changes, however, and on June 23, 1943, the other countries extended diplomatic recognition.

The final diplomatic event of the war period was the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Chapultepec, from February 21 to March 8, 1945. The conferees were much concerned with postwar relationships and activities. The Dumbarton Oaks draft charter for a United Nations Organization, prepared at the Washington, D. C., meeting of the great allied powers from August 21 to October 10, 1944, had referred to regional organizations as contributors to the maintenance of international peace under the rules of the universal organization. The Latin American countries felt that the inter-American system should be strengthened and should receive a specifically recognized role in such an organization.

Accordingly, many structural changes for the Pan American Union were proposed, and in the Declaration of Mexico the signatory states agreed to statements concerning individual political and social rights, as well as to the traditional obligations of states among themselves. A *pro forma* agreement concerning Argentina had been reached earlier, and was voted unanimously; if Argentina would qualify for membership in the United Nations, all the signatories would extend their diplomatic recognition to her government. On March 27, 1945, Argentina adhered opportunistically to the Final Act of Chapultepec, and declared war on the Axis. On April 9, recognition was extended. Argen-

tina actually did little to honor her pledge, but the bothersome dispute had been papered over and inter-American unity was restored for the time being.

Events in the diplomatic arena were often tortuous during this period, but for the most part they were resolved in theory. The United States was guided by its need to remain secure in the Hemisphere; thus essentially it regarded the Latin Americans as people to be immunized from the war as much as possible—if necessary, in spite of themselves. Hopefully, the war would be fought in the world's other Hemisphere by the major allied powers, while the Latins supplied strategic raw materials and played roles in the ostensible defense of their own territories. At the theoretical level, military relationships in the Hemisphere reflected these diplomatic understandings. But at the level of detailed operations, the difficulty of executing the theoretical agreements often became great.

MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

Military collaboration between the United States and the Latin American countries took several forms during the war. In part collaboration can be differentiated in terms of means employed, and in part in terms of mission. Additionally, missions changed as high-level strategic conditions changed from mere defense of the Hemisphere against invasion, to offense against the Axis in the other Hemisphere. The forms of collaboration included lend-lease or sales of equipment, technical assistance, and actual military operations involving troops, equipment and the joint construction and use of bases and installations. Priorities were established. In most instances, Latin American countries received far less equipment than they expected, and with more strings attached. Only a few governments actually received much, and these were governments which actually sent troops abroad to fight and were located strategically.

A fundamental obstacle to the development of a concrete military policy of American defense lay in the United States tradition of neutrality toward non-hemispheric conflicts. Congressional investigations in the

1930's had led to the general belief among Americans that World War I had been the result of the insane ambitions of some European leaders, and that the United States had been drawn in by means of artful propaganda conceived by groups that profited from this involvement. The Neutrality Act of 1935 had allowed the President to prohibit the export of war materials to belligerent powers; in 1935 and 1936, this law had been invoked even against shipments to participants in the Chaco war. The law was stiffened by amendments in 1936 and 1937, although in November, 1939, after the attack on Poland, a liberalizing change permitted cash sales to Britain and France. Only in November, 1941, was the law amended to permit United States armed merchant ships to sail into regions described by presidential decree as dangerous, and only after Pearl Harbor was all neutrality legislation rescinded. Since President Roosevelt was as reluctant as most other Americans to see the country become involved in a European war, it was very difficult for the United States to play a decisive diplomatic role. After 1938, when Roosevelt began to be convinced that national security demanded greater United States help to the Western democracies, however, the executive branch constantly was forced to seek ways in which to circumvent the limiting laws.

The situation in the Western Hemisphere was theoretically different. Early in the 1930's, a series of contingency plans against external attacks had been prepared. Even while the United States was relinquishing its protectorates over countries in the Caribbean region, it was creating what it regarded as mutual undertakings for hemispheric defense. As the aggressive plans of the fascist powers developed, senior United States military planners began (on November 8, 1938) to reconsider the strategic needs of the region. Five "Rainbow" plans were developed, assuming fascist action under differing peripheral conditions. "Rainbow 1" was adopted in August, 1939; it called for unilateral United States defense of the Hemisphere north of 10° south latitude, and assumed that the European and Latin American democracies would

remain neutral. "Rainbow 5" assumed British and French involvement, with United States forces assisting those countries in the other Hemisphere against a fascist alliance. After the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940, which created the alliance known as the Axis, this latter plan was obviously more relevant. In either case, however, the United States needed bases and collaboration from the Latin Americans.

Despite the diplomatic commitments of 1939 and 1940 (and even of 1942) to hemispheric defense, it was difficult for the United States to negotiate with Latin Americans for military collaboration. Some United States officials frankly considered Latin attitudes a nuisance, and held that the increasing peril of the democratic world should override Latin sensitivity over national sovereignty. Nonetheless, Latin suspicion of United States motives had scarcely been allayed for most people by a single decade of good neighborliness. It was too easy for political opponents of incumbent governments to spread rumors or to raise doubts based on dubious information, or to attack the patriotism of those conducting negotiations; this occurred especially in Mexico and Uruguay. Often, opposition groups were financed and encouraged by ubiquitous Nazi agents.

Hemispheric defense demanded that naval and air bases be made available to United States forces. Many months of propaganda battles and negotiations passed before most Latin Americans would accept the claim that the United States wished to have access to installations in time of need, but that it would not supplant local sovereignty nor insist on large staffs of resident Americans at the bases. The destroyers-for-bases arrangement with Britain of September, 1940, whereby the United States leased sites and actually assumed quasi-sovereign rights, as well as the Guantánamo base precedent in Cuba, where the United States possesses complete *de facto* sovereignty, were dangerous precedents. United States Navy authorities *did* expect initially that they would have similar authority at any bases built in Mexico.

The most specific problem—and in the long

run one of the most difficult to resolve in detail—was the task of achieving agreement with Panama over the protection of the canal. The American protectorate of Panama was abolished on March 2, 1936; in that treaty the countries recognized a joint undertaking to protect the canal zone. Negotiations for new military installations were begun by the United States after the Havana foreign ministers' meeting in 1940, but three Panamanian Presidents debated and procrastinated at length, demanding a price the Americans were unwilling to pay. In April, 1941, while negotiations continued, United States Army and Navy personnel occupied the most vital sites and built the needed installations. Agreements were signed to this effect on May 18, 1942; United States personnel staffed nearly all the locations.

DEFENSE OF BRAZIL

Relations with Brazil were more complex, not because of official Brazilian reluctance to collaborate in general with the United States defense effort, nor because of governmental instability, but because of the wide variety of contacts. The possibility of a German invasion of the "bulge" of Brazil, in combination with growing needs for air bases in the Natal area, led to United States efforts to obtain agreements as early as March, 1939. To ease the position of the Brazilian government, Pan American Airways was chosen to improve or to build sites in the region and throughout the Hemisphere. Before Pearl Harbor, 8 sites were opened or improved in Brazil, and 13 other sites were opened or improved in 7 other countries and in Dutch Guiana. Before the end of the construction program in 1944, Pan American had built or improved 40 sites, including 16 landing fields and 5 seaplane sites in Brazil.

Negotiations for these bases reflected only one facet of the complex relations that led to the establishment of a joint United States-Brazilian staff conference for planning in July, 1941. Later, in December, a Joint Board for Northeast Brazil was also established. On November 26, after Germans had sunk a number of ships near the Brazilian coast, the gov-

ernment dared to allow the unlimited use of its ports by United States naval vessels and aircraft on patrol; the price was the receipt of a number of training planes for the Brazilian Air Force. For over 15 months, an embarrassing (to the United States) effort was made to send serviceable coastal defense cannon to the bulge at Brazilian request. As early as June, 1940, the Brazilian armed forces had presented a list of about \$180 million worth of equipment; granted the supply conditions in the United States and the priority position of Britain, the demand presented an impossible condition. By early 1942, however, it was possible for the United States to begin sending very large quantities of equipment to Brazil, and on May 28, 1942, Joint Defense Commissions were authorized to sit in both Rio de Janeiro and Washington. In August, 1942, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy. From September, 1944, to May, 1945, some 25,000 Brazilian ground forces and an air squadron served in Italy. During the war, Brazil received about \$230 million in Army lend-lease equipment from the United States; the total of lend-lease equipment received during and after the war was about \$366 million, nearly three-fourths of the total of aid to all Latin American countries combined.

The third Latin American country to receive highly detailed attention from United States military planners was Mexico. Naval bases on both coasts of Mexico were sought in May, 1940, after the fall of France, and staff discussions concerning United States use and fortification of airfields were held. But the elections of July, 1940, and the subsequent political disorders and challenges to the newly-elected President, delayed further talks to 1941. President Manuel Avila Camacho had agreed to a Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission in December, 1940. Officers met for discussions as early as February, 1941, yet the commission was not established until January 12, 1942. Since Mexico was relatively protected from Axis attack because of her location, United States military relationships with that country were much less developed than those with Brazil. However, as in Brazil, Pan American Airways con-

tracted to build airfields, completing eight sites in Mexico. Mexico declared war on the Axis in May, 1942, and a Mexican air squadron participated in combat in the Philippine Islands in 1945. A total of only \$39 million in lend-lease equipment and goods was made available to Mexico up to the termination of the program in 1946.

Other Latin American countries were involved in varying degrees. Cuba, the site of the Guantánamo naval station, signed several agreements by which United States anti-submarine patrols were operated from other Cuban ports, and Cuba's airfields were available for the ferrying route for aircraft flown to Europe via the bulge of Brazil. The various other Caribbean countries made bases available to United States forces, and United States Army, Naval or Air Force units or installations were established in all the Central American countries, in Venezuela, and in the west coast countries of South America. Uruguay also allowed the establishment of bases. In general, few of the Latin American countries received as much equipment as they had hoped for.

The policies of the Latin Americans toward the United States and vice versa during the war were different from their relations before and after that period only in degree. Nationalism, pride, suspicion and dependence were present on the Latin American side. Superior power, ethnocentrism, some ingenuousness about verbal commitments, and insistence on retaining autonomy of decision-making were present on the United States side. An unprecedented collaboration occurred after Pearl Harbor; in many cases this made possible both diplomatic and military understandings. The conference at Chapultepec implied to all that in the post-war era, the Hemisphere would see harder bargaining.

The military collaboration of Latin Americans with North Americans was important largely for Latin America's internal security. The United States needed many of the mineral and agricultural resources of Latin America, and thus felt it not inappropriate to help local police and armies to maintain their credi-

bility. No United States forces adequate to the task of defending the entire Hemisphere were available during the period of greatest actual peril, in 1940-1942, nor could the United States then spare the necessary arms. Few Latin American countries were willing to allow United States military units to occupy positions in their territory in any case, except under very restricted circumstances. It was not until well into the war that United States units, admitted for operational purposes, were given full tactical autonomy by Latin American military or government officials. On the other hand, no Latin American country possessed trained and equipped forces that could have withstood a German attack. Thus, the "defense effort" in the region could not possibly have been adequate except for modest efforts to suppress subversion or rebellions.

In effect, the "Rainbow 1" plan, adopted in 1939, was more relevant to the circumstances than was generally realized. Later changes in circumstances actually decreased, rather than increased, the importance of the military participation of Latin Americans in the war, save for Brazil. Brazilians and Mexicans did participate on the Western allied side in combat but, in both cases, training in large part and supplies and support in full were supplied by the United States. The Latin American role, therefore, was determined fundamentally by the economic, political-organizational and technical lag of the individual countries in relation to the demands of modern war. These disabling factors remain as the principal problems of Latin America today, despite the very broad claims made on the societies of Latin America by most armed forces of the region.

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"For a decade and a half following World War II the Communist issue and the urgency of economic development persisted as the central themes of all major inter-American conferences. . . . In this climate of political instability and suspicion the United States and the Latin American republics sought to build a regional security mechanism that would respect the absolute ban on intervention and still be adaptable to the changing needs of the Hemisphere for defense against attack from without and within."

The Early Cold War Period

BY ROLLIE E. POPPINO

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UNITED STATES-Latin American relations were placed in a new context after World War II with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower and leader of an ideological bloc openly bent on world domination. Basic United States national security objectives in Latin America did not change, but their scope was broadened and the tactics adopted to achieve them were substantially modified by the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower under the impact of the cold war, the Korean War, the Guatemalan episode and the Cuban revolution.

In the immediate postwar years the United States was chiefly concerned to incorporate the inter-American system, including its Hemisphere defense apparatus, into the new United Nations Organization, which was expected to provide ample safeguards for world peace. When this illusion waned with the opening of the cold war in 1947, the United States assumed primary responsibility for the defense of the entire free world, relegating Latin America to a secondary position in its global strategy. In Washington's view, the threat posed by international communism to free nations everywhere must be met first and most forcefully where the danger was most imminent, in the Old World. In these circumstances, more than 90 per cent of all

United States military and economic aid was allocated to allies in Europe and Asia.

The unspoken premise of United States policy—that Latin America, as a politically safe area, did not require massive economic assistance—was vigorously challenged by all Latin American chiefs of state and by successive delegations to inter-American meetings between 1945 and 1960. The representatives of the United States and its sister republics were normally in accord about the desirability of joint action in the defense of the Hemisphere, but they could seldom agree upon the nature and seriousness of the Communist threat or appropriate measures for combatting it. Latin Americans generally regarded the United States somewhat as a wealthy eccentric whose exaggerated view of the danger of Communist subversion must be tolerated as the price of his generosity. Largely for this reason the Latin American governments periodically endorsed formal inter-American declarations against the activities and aspirations of international communism in the Western Hemisphere.

The recommendations in these documents were rarely implemented, however, except by outright dictators such as Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, who applied the Communist label to all political opposition. Rulers

of this type flaunted their repressive anti-communism on the reasonable assumption that such action would improve their images in Washington and thus bolster their regimes. Other Latin American leaders usually minimized the immediate Communist threat, insisting that the most pressing problems of the region were economic and social, and calling upon the United States to lend its vital support to ambitious development programs.

For a decade and a half following World War II, the Communist issue and the urgency of economic development persisted as the central themes of all major inter-American conferences and pervaded the often stormy debates over other political and economic questions facing the American nations. During the same period, recurrent political crises brought more than 25 violent changes of regime to 16 countries and no fewer than 10 armed incursions across national boundaries in Latin America. In this climate of political instability and suspicion, the United States and the Latin American republics sought to build a regional security mechanism that would respect the absolute ban on intervention and still be adaptable to the changing needs of the Hemisphere for defense against attack from without and within. Despite the unfavorable atmosphere considerable progress was made, for the proven vulnerability of so many American governments to assault and subversion increased the determination of the inter-American community to devise more efficient instruments to preserve the individual and collective security of the American states.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE U.N.

On April 25, 1945, the allied powers met in San Francisco to establish the United Nations. The 20 Latin American republics accounted for one-third of the delegations. Because of the resistance of the United States, the Chapultepec Conference¹ had failed to produce a formal resolution about the appropriate relationship between the long-established Pan American Union and the incipient world or-

ganization, but at San Francisco the Latin American delegates made it clear that the Pan American Union must retain its identity and regional autonomy within the new body. The United States acquiesced in the unanimous Latin American view. The ultimate solution, inspired by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R., Mich.) of the United States delegation, recognized the inherent right of "collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs," subject to the right of the United Nations Security Council to intervene at any time "to maintain or restore international peace and security." In practice, until 1960 all disputes between American states were settled under procedures established by the inter-American community.

Although no one could be certain in 1945 that the Security Council would consistently follow a hands-off policy toward threats to peace in the Western Hemisphere, the United States was not disturbed over this point as long as its relations with the Soviet Union were amicable. When these deteriorated, however, Washington reassessed its position on Hemisphere security. For two years the proposed conference to give permanent form to the collective defense arrangements determined at Chapultepec had been blocked by continuing disagreements between the United States and the Juan Perón dictatorship in Argentina and by the reluctance of the other republics to exclude Argentina from any regional defense pact. The Latin Americans would not abandon the principle of Hemisphere solidarity, but by mid-1947, under the gathering clouds of the cold war, the United States was willing to change its stand. In the name of Hemisphere solidarity, Washington patched up its quarrel with Argentina and supported the call for the conference. This move, widely criticized in the United States as appeasement, was dictated by the requirements of national security. In addition to the long-standing and mutually accepted objectives expressed in the Act of Chapultepec, the United States sought to close the door to the possibility of Soviet intervention through the United Nations in matters affecting the peace and sovereignty of the

¹ See Philip B. Taylor, Jr., "Hemisphere Defense in World War II," pp. 333ff. of this issue.

Western Hemisphere republics and, incidentally, to erect safeguards against the expansionist inclinations of the Perón regime. These goals were achieved in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the Rio Treaty, which stands as the single most important agreement among the American states for the defense of the Hemisphere.²

The Rio Treaty was the product of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, which met at Quitandinha near Rio de Janeiro from August 15 to September 2, 1947. This conference, and the inter-American meeting at Bogotá eight months later, may be said to mark the high point of the Good Neighbor Policy launched fourteen years before. The Latin American nations revealed no fear of military intervention or other improper use of power by the "colossus of the north." They and the United States were now prepared to surrender permanently a portion of their precious national sovereignty to the common desire for Hemisphere peace and cooperation. Moreover, they appreciated fully the importance of the step they were taking. This gave the conference a special significance that accounted for the generally high political level of the participants. In the case of the United States, the delegation was headed by Secretary of State George Marshall and included the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a ranking minority member from both the Senate and House of Representatives. President Harry Truman traveled to Brazil to address the closing session in person. His presence was a measure of the importance of Hemisphere security to the United States.

The Rio Treaty did not mention international communism as a threat to the security of the American republics. While it allowed for the possibility of "an aggression which is not an armed attack," the language of the treaty implies that the delegates were concerned above all with measures to deter traditional warfare across national boundaries.

To this end they reaffirmed the well-established principle of peaceful settlement of all disputes between American nations and reiterated the basic concept that an attack on one American state was an attack on all, to be repelled by collective action. In the event of an armed attack or threat to the peace, the treaty provided for consultation "without delay" by the foreign ministers of the signatory powers, and it went beyond previous agreements in stipulating that sanctions short of the use of armed force approved by two-thirds of the member states were binding on all. The framers of the treaty took special pains to identify the Hemisphere defense system with the purposes and provisions of the United Nations, but at the same time they required the signatory states to exhaust the peacekeeping machinery of the inter-American system before submitting any controversy among them to the world body for settlement. Finally, it was stipulated that the fundamental provisions of the treaty should be "incorporated in the Organic Pact of the Inter-American System," to be drawn up at the forthcoming conference in Bogotá. The United States was the third nation to ratify the Rio Treaty, which entered into force with the fourteenth ratification in December, 1948. By April, 1955, the treaty was in effect among all 21 American republics.

At the Ninth International Conference of American States, in Bogotá, Colombia, March 31–May 1, 1948, the inter-American system that had evolved haphazardly since 1889 was placed on a firm treaty basis as the Organization of American States. The United States fully supported the transformation, for it recognized that a coherent and functioning regional political body would complement the collective security mechanism devised at Quitandinha. The Latin American republics were equally enthusiastic, for they expected to gain greater influence in the revised organization and hoped to establish the principle that economic development was as vital as political and military cooperation to the security of the Hemisphere. Although both sides were to be disappointed later, the conference convened in an atmosphere of optimism

² For text of this treaty, see page 363 of this issue.

and good will that was not shattered by the violent rioting that swept over Bogotá in April, 1948. The new charter retained most of the existing institutions, with some changes in nomenclature and a few significant changes in authority and jurisdiction. The Pan American Union, for example, was converted into the secretariat of the organization, under the direction of a secretary general to be elected for a 10-year term and under the supervision of the 21-member Council of the Organization of American States, which was to meet in permanent session and take cognizance of any matter referred to it by the Inter-American Conference or Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The council would also serve as a provisional organ of consultation in case of an armed attack or other threat to the peace. The Inter-American Defense Board was directly and exclusively responsible to the council. In other matters relating to peace and security the charter strengthened the principle of collective action by repeating the essence of the Rio Treaty.

The Bogotá conference also reflected the growing United States concern over the menace of international communism. In a separate resolution on the Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America, the conference declared international communism incompatible with the American concept of freedom and called on the member states to control the activities of local Communists.

Latin American concern for economic development was recognized but not satisfied at Bogotá. The charter contained several innocuous references to economic cooperation in its statement of purposes and principles, as well as a brief chapter devoted exclusively to "economic standards," which pledged the member states to cooperate "as far as their resources may permit and their laws may provide." It created the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, responsible for promoting "the economic and social welfare of the American nations," but this was a technical organ designed to study problems, without funds to resolve them. No one at Bogotá could commit the United States to underwrite regional economic development on the

desired scale, and without United States financial backing the economic provisions of the charter remained only aspirations.

After the Bogotá conference, it appeared that United States security objectives in Latin America had been attained. When the first serious test came, however, with the Korean War in 1950, it was quickly evident that Latin America lacked both the will and the means to participate in a major military contest in support of the principles of the inter-American community and the United Nations. The Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which convened at Washington in March, 1951, to consider this problem, produced a stirring protestation of inter-American intent to remain "steadfastly united," another anti-Communist resolution, a promise to see what, if anything, each republic could contribute to the collective security effort in Korea, and 17 resolutions dealing with economic questions. Although most Latin American republics volunteered to send token assistance to Korea, only Colombia was willing and able to meet the request of the United Nations Command for contingents of at least 1,000 men. The level of Hemisphere defense was lower than it had been in 1945.

The sources of this difficulty lay both in the United States and in Latin America. The postwar surge of Latin American nationalism, exacerbated by the Communists in most countries, contributed to widespread demonstrations and a propaganda campaign against the United States. It was generally held that the cold war, and subsequently the Korean War, were controversies between the United States and the Soviet Union, of no direct concern to Latin America. In many nations, ultranationalist minorities denounced collective security agreements that reduced sovereignty and could lead to the use of the armed forces on foreign soil "in the service of Yankee imperialism." An even greater deterrent was the fact that the Latin American armed forces did not include significant numbers of troops trained and equipped for modern combat. This situation reflected a failure of United States military policy.

At the end of World War II, the Inter-

American Defense Board had proposed—and the Truman administration had recommended to Congress—a regional program to standardize the equipment, organization and training of the military forces of the American republics. In effect, Latin America would provide manpower for Hemisphere defense while the United States would supply training missions and equipment, as it had done during the war. The proposal was well received by the Latin American governments. Congress, however, apparently convinced that the program would add an unnecessary and unbearable burden to already weak Latin American economies, and would perpetuate or encourage military dictatorships, consistently refused its approval. With the expiration of Lend-Lease legislation the United States could supply war surplus materiel only for cash. In these circumstances, the Latin American armed forces acquired new equipment on easy credit terms in Europe, sacrificing the potential advantages of standardization. The arms available from the United States were too little, too old and too costly.

The Pentagon sought to salvage as much of the program as possible through bilateral arrangements, stressing military missions to Latin America and the training of Latin American officers at service schools in the United States and in the Canal Zone. The number of army, navy and air attachés at United States embassies throughout Latin America was also increased. By 1950, there were 49 such posts in 19 republics. Meanwhile, in response to the growing Communist threat abroad, the Congress approved the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, which in effect revived the Lend-Lease concept in United States military relations with the NATO countries.

Not until 1951, however, following the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, was this concept extended to Latin America. The Mutual Security Act of that year authorized military assistance to the American republics on an individual basis and for specific purposes in accordance with Hemisphere defense plans. With such authorization, between 1952 and 1955 the United States en-

tered separate Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements with 12 Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay). Except in the case of Cuba, these agreements were still in force at the end of 1960. In terms of military equipment granted by the United States, their cost was under \$400 million, a modest sum that could produce only modest results.

In the early 1950's, international developments tended to intensify the political and economic differences separating Latin America and the United States. The Korean War briefly reversed the downward trend in the demand and price for Latin American exports, but with the end of hostilities there was a dramatic drop in the level of trade and a comparable rise in Latin American pressure for economic assistance from the United States. At the same time the United States, having checked overt Communist aggression in Korea, was becoming increasingly alarmed over the danger of Soviet-abetted subversion by Communist parties in the free world. Washington was particularly disturbed by Latin American disregard for the trend of events in Guatemala where, by 1953, the Communists had come to exert preponderant influence over the Arbenz Guzman regime. The United States hoped to alert Latin America to the seriousness of the danger facing the Hemisphere, while the Latin American governments hoped to awaken the United States to the urgency for economic cooperation.

The confrontation occurred at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, in Caracas, Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954. Although the conference produced three conventions and 117 resolutions, the essence of its labors was found in two resolutions wherein the United States obtained a strong anti-Communist declaration and agreed to the summoning of a special Meeting of Finance Ministers later in the year to discuss Hemisphere economic problems.

By far the most controversial issue at Caracas was the United States proposal to con-

demn the intervention of international communism in the Western Hemisphere. In final form as Resolution 93, it repeated earlier inter-American statements on the subject.

The anti-Communist resolution was approved by all the American republics except Argentina and Mexico, which abstained, and Guatemala, which opposed. The pressure the United States delegation had exerted to secure the votes, however, confirmed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' reputation for heavy-handedness in dealing with Latin America, and contributed to a further deterioration in inter-American relations. Ironically, Resolution 93, which satisfied the United States, infuriated Guatemala, and irritated the other republics, was never used, for it was overtaken by the events that toppled the Arbenz government in June, 1954, and it was to prove inadequate to cope with the Communist threat in Cuba six years later.

The final crisis in Guatemala was touched off by the arrival of a shipment of Soviet bloc arms late in May and the invasion of the country by Colonel Castillo Armas' rag-tag "liberation army" in mid-June. The invasion forces had been prepared in Honduras and Nicaragua and were reportedly armed in part with weapons supplied by the United States to Honduras under a military assistance agreement. Efforts to resolve the question by peaceful means—complicated by Guatemala's simultaneous appeal both to the Organization of American States and to the United Nations—were cut short by the collapse of the Arbenz regime. The Guatemalan army had refused either to defend the government or to permit it to arm the civilian population. Arbenz resigned and, with hundreds of Communist supporters, sought asylum and exile, paving the way for Castillo Armas to succeed to the presidency. It was widely accepted as a matter of fact throughout Latin America that the United States was responsible for the fall of the Arbenz government.

The Meeting of Finance Ministers of the American Republics took place at Rio in November, 1954. The Latin American delegates were disappointed once more, for the United States would agree neither to assure

fixed prices for export commodities nor to participate in the formation of an inter-American bank to provide loans for projects not covered by existing lending agencies. Substantially these same views were expressed at the long-delayed Economic Conference of American States, at Buenos Aires in August, 1957. The United States objected in principle to international commodity agreements and maintained that the lending capacity of the Export-Import Bank was ample to meet Latin American needs. Washington was, in fact, contributing significant amounts of economic assistance, in the form of public loans and grants, to the 20 republics, but its repeated refusal even to consider their two chief preoccupations added to the Latin Americans' belief that the wealthiest nation in the world was neglecting them.

At the same time, a political trend that was publicly applauded at every opportunity by Washington officials was also contributing to the growing Latin American dissatisfaction with United States policy. A rash of coups and revolts toppled dictatorships in five countries (Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Honduras and Venezuela) between September, 1955, and January, 1958. As each strongman was removed from power and the people regained freedom of speech, the United States was denounced for having maintained "friendly" relations with him. The reaction was particularly intense among Venezuelans, whose ex-dictator was granted asylum in Florida. The United States was also condemned for its alleged support of Fulgencio Batista, who was using arms provided for Hemisphere defense to combat Cuban rebels led by Fidel Castro. The termination of military aid to Cuba in mid-1958 came too late to affect the attitude of Latin Americans.

(Continued on page 369)

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"During the Kennedy-Johnson years, the United States military assistance program to Latin America was supposedly altered to counter Communist subversion." In this era, "Two key words were 'counterinsurgency' and 'civic action,' which represented the two aspects of the crusade against communism."

Military Commitments in Latin America: 1960-1968

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DURING THE 1950's the United States neglected Latin America economically, politically and strategically. Economically, Latin America received less attention than did Europe. Politically, many Latin American nations drifted into the second half of the century still ruled by pre-1900 social oligarchies or by military juntas, armed by the United States during World War II, the twentieth century counterparts of the nineteenth century men on horseback. Strategically, the area was considered less crucial and less vulnerable than Western Europe. When the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration became involved in Latin American affairs—as in the Guatemalan revolution of 1954—its purpose was to remove the nuisance of a pro-Communist government rather than to further progressive, enlightened change. What altered United States policy, at least quantitatively, was Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba.

In all fairness, the United States was not directly responsible for Castro. To be sure, the United States had interfered in Cuban matters intermittently throughout the nineteenth century, had launched a military intervention in the island in 1898, and had followed the defeat of Spanish colonialism with

a protectorate that lasted until 1934. The success of Sergeant Fulgencio Batista in 1933-1934 in gaining command of Cuba's destiny was directly related to United States policy. Batista, who was either president-maker or President of the republic from 1934 to 1952, carefully manipulated Cuban politics and the economy to please American onlookers. His return to power in March, 1952, inaugurated a regime that became increasingly totalitarian, but one that displayed a facade of democracy and prosperity and a rigid anti-Communist position in international affairs.

Castro's rebellion, launched in 1953, was aimed initially at the illegality of Batista's rule. Only later did revolutionary tracts begin to explore the vast socio-economic inequities in Cuban society. Earl E. T. Smith, Eisenhower's Ambassador in Cuba, was genuinely skeptical of the nature of Castro's rebellion, but he was considerably embarrassed by the repressive tactics of Batista's military machine, largely equipped with United States weapons. The Eisenhower administration imposed an embargo on arms and tried, ineffectually, to get Batista to resign. Batista's rapid departure in the early hours of January 1, 1959, which opened the doors of Havana to Castro's band, came about because a large number of Cubans, especially professional and commercial groups, had lost faith in Batista's ability to govern.¹

¹ For a detailed account of Cuban-United States relations see my *The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History* (New York: Wiley, 1968).

The next two years witnessed a steady deterioration in Cuban-United States relations. Historians, political scientists, journalists and free-lance writers have expended reams of paper analyzing the breakdown in dialogue between Havana and Washington. Castro's expropriation of foreign-owned properties, the farcical "trials" of former Batista henchmen, the suspension of Cuba's sugar quota and, finally, the ultimate severance of diplomatic relations early in 1961 seem in retrospect tragic and unnecessary.

The planning for an invasion of Cuba, begun during the Eisenhower years, convinced some commentators that the United States was "forcing" Castro to turn to the Soviet Union and, ultimately, to communism. This was, of course, as irrational a conclusion as its antithesis—that Castro had always been a Communist and had always plotted to lead Cuba into the Soviet bloc. John F. Kennedy's inheritance of the Eisenhower administration's Cuban policy and his administration's gross mishandling of the Cuban problem in the April, 1961, Bay of Pigs invasion proved to be wearisome burdens in the 1960's.

KENNEDY'S AIMS

During the 1950's Kennedy—like Franklin Roosevelt in the 1920's—had been critical of the cosy association between the United States and the "visible" Latin America—the generals, ambassadors, businessmen and older patriarchal families. The "invisible" Latin America was impoverished, uneducated and forgotten. When United States officials decorated dictators and sent them tanks and rifles to suppress street demonstrations, charges that the United States operated in collusion with Latin American tyrants appeared substantiated. The 1958 visit of Richard Nixon, then Vice President, to Latin America occurred shortly after two hated regimes that had profited from an affiliation with the United States had been overthrown. The street agitators were not directing their rocks and spittle at the Vice President personally but at what he symbolized.

Thus, in John Kennedy's view, what was needed was a new approach, one that repre-

sented the best of United States culture and philanthropy and that could be identified with the revolution of rising expectations. There was, he believed, a nonviolent way to achieve social and economic change in Latin America, and before his inauguration the broad outlines of the Alliance for Progress were already visible. For too long the United States had been the comrade of the Latin American elite. Kennedy argued that it must champion and aid the friends of democracy in Latin America, the progressive political forces whose leadership held out the last hope for peaceful change. But to give democratic presidents a warm *abrazo* and military *caudillos* a polite, but reserved, handshake was insufficient to demonstrate political preferences.

United States commitment to Latin American democracy, Kennedy contended, must be accompanied by long-range economic planning aimed at the faltering Latin American economies. The rigidities of past attitudes must be supplanted by flexible attitudes directed at obliterating illiteracy and hunger and at fostering land reform. From its inception the Alliance for Progress rested on the assumption that there was a middle way between violent upheaval, such as Castro's revolution, and the unrelieved oppressiveness of the status quo.

The emphasis on progressive social change was, of course, a traditional liberal response to the specter of revolution. But Castro's revolution, which convinced the apathetic that something had to be done, also left in its wake an inevitable reaction against reform. Many Americans had demonstrated their emotional preference for the bearded warrior of the Sierra Maestra only to discover that he had led Cuba down the road to communism. Thus, some Americans argued, the United States could not hope to maintain its command of a Latin American revolution; to encourage the Latin American progressives, who were politically unstable and economically unpredictable, would be tantamount to paving the way for Communist takeovers. For all their unredeeming qualities, it was said, the real friends of the United

States in Latin America were the older families, businessmen and generals who, despite their dungeons and truncheons, were anti-Communist and could be counted on at Armageddon.

PLANNING THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Kennedy organized a special group, headed by Richard Goodwin, a presidential staff writer, to deal specifically with Latin American problems. The group's first report came out in early 1961 and emphasized the need for action to meet the Communist threat, which was as insidious and powerful as the Nazi challenge in the Hemisphere in the 1930's. The report noted that Communist efforts were directed not only at subverting existing governments but also at establishing anti-United States regimes throughout Latin America. The immediate danger lay in guerrilla warfare, especially in the Caribbean and the mountainous regions of the Andes. But the traditional military response—the legitimate government, armed with American-made weapons, counterattacking in the countryside and suppressing civil liberties in the cities—would be woefully inadequate, in the view of this special group. The United States should continue to provide these governments with necessary equipment to meet the guerrilla threat, the report continued, but it must also convince Latin American leaders that they should make a special effort to remove the poverty, hunger and illiteracy in their midst.

In line with such reasoning, the United States delegates traveled to Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August, 1961. The conference met only a few months after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, where the United States had been clearly implicated in the attempt to overthrow the Castro government and from which Castro and Castroism had benefited tremendously. Ernesto Che Guevara, Castro's aide and his ideologue of violent upheaval, attended the meeting, trying to convince the other Latin Americans that rev-

olution was inevitable. Some, indeed, were in favor of Cuba's participation in the Alliance for Progress, but skillful closed-door bargaining by the United States resulted in the exclusion of Castro's government.

The initial United States proposals, which called for political self-determination, economic development, better housing, agrarian reform, better working conditions, elimination of illiteracy, tax reform and fiscal renovation, were in themselves revolutionary utterances. The goals were projected in a 10-year plan, and the United States pledged to provide a substantial portion of the \$20 billion necessary to make the Alliance dream a reality.

Already, cynics were referring to the Alliance for Progress as "Fidel's program" and the money to fund it as "Fidel's money," and doubtless some of the delegates joined in enthusiastically because they saw in Alliance funds a financial windfall. But Kennedy intended to compel compliance from recalcitrant governments by applying diplomatic or economic sanctions. He was also determined to rid the Organization of American States of Castro's Cuba, a sentiment shared by several other governments, particularly the harassed Venezuelans, who fought Castroite bands every day in the highlands. The exclusion of Cuba came at Punta del Este II, which met in January, 1962. Unfortunately for United States policy, those nations which did not want to exclude Cuba included the more powerful and prestigious countries, like Brazil and Mexico, which were reluctant to cut off all economic and political ties with Havana. The United States barely won the necessary votes to exclude Cuba from the O.A.S. (and in winning had to promise economic aid for the crucial Haitian vote), but all 20 representatives believed that the Castro government was "incompatible" with traditional principles of inter-Americanism.²

MILITARY COUPS

Very early in his presidency, Kennedy was given an opportunity to demonstrate his attitudes toward the Latin American military. Three weeks after his inauguration he de-

² In this assessment of the Alliance for Progress, I have depended heavily on Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).

manded that an El Salvadorean junta—in return for diplomatic recognition—must promise to hold elections as a means of re-establishing constitutional government. And when Rafael Trujillo (who had ruled the Dominican Republic as if it were his personal fiefdom since 1930) met with violent death on a lonely highway in May, 1961, diplomatic pressure and finally the presence of United States warships proved decisive in preventing a takeover by the dictator's family.

But these countries were geographically closer and more vulnerable to United States diplomatic efforts than the larger republics of South America. In late March, 1962, the Argentine military, forewarned that a coup would be incompatible with the principles of the Alliance, nevertheless ousted the constitutionally elected government of President Arturo Frondizi. The generals quickly installed José María Guido as President, and the Kennedy administration, which had seriously considered non-recognition and the suspension of aid, capitulated to the argument that normal constitutional processes had not been thwarted.

Washington's acquiescence may have been instrumental in convincing the Peruvian military that it was safe to institute a military regime in July, 1962, despite the repeated warnings of economic and diplomatic retaliation voiced by American officials. At first, the United States proceeded energetically to carry out its threats by suspending diplomatic relations, cutting off economic assistance and terminating military aid. But some Latin American republics, such as Mexico, contended that non-recognition in this instance constituted an arbitrary device employed by the United States to police the Hemisphere. Several Latin American and European nations recognized the junta; United States citizens who held business interests in Peru applied pressure; and the Kennedy administration had to back down. On August 17,

the United States recognized Peru's new government and restored economic and military aid.

A rash of military takeovers in Guatemala, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras followed. Different explanations for the coups existed in each case, but in each of the republics, as in Argentina and Peru, the military seizure of power proved inherently damaging to political democracy and progressive reform, the twin principles of the Alliance for Progress. In Guatemala, for instance, the generals gambled that the United States was dissatisfied with the government in power but feared that elections would bring a pro-Communist to the executive office. Their reasoning proved correct, for the Kennedy administration waited only three weeks after the coup to extend recognition. In Ecuador, the generals made similar calculations and won their bid for recognition. Certainly, in these instances, the juntas had to promise to hold elections in return for United States diplomatic blessing, but such pledges were often vaguely couched and were fulfilled only after unduly long intervals.

In the Dominican Republic and Honduras, the military ran into more formidable barriers. The man who symbolized the democratic left in the Dominican Republic was Juan Bosch, who had been chosen President in the wake of Trujillo's assassination. Bosch's political affiliations alienated the powerful Dominican military and aroused the suspicion of United States military men assigned to the Military Advisory Assistance Program. In their eyes, Bosch was a dreamer, an intellectual and probably a Communist. The Dominican military may have taken casual remarks too seriously, however, in their decision to overthrow Bosch. Following the September 26, 1963, coup, the United States Department of State vigorously condemned the takeover and suspended diplomatic relations and economic aid. The Dominican action seemed to be a sign that Washington was getting tougher. When the generals in Honduras removed the civilians in office in early October, they received a stern rebuff from the United States.³

³ For a detailed discussion of the resurgence of Latin American militarism in the 1960's, see Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1964). Lieuwen also authored the classic work on Latin American militarism, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1960).

JOHNSON'S POLICIES

When Lyndon Baines Johnson inherited Kennedy's Latin American policies, he reshaped them to conform to his own predilections. He did not share his predecessor's faith in the progressive left nor his hostility toward the military. But all the dilemmas that he would face in Latin America were not of his making. Kennedy had exhibited an enthusiasm where the Alliance for Progress was concerned, but in November, 1963, when Johnson became President, the lofty dreams of social and economic progress were no longer as convincing in the face of the hard realities of population explosion and economic stagnation that persisted in Latin America. Thus, with militarism and leftist violence reviving, it seemed to be more practicable for Lyndon Johnson to veer slightly to the right, especially in view of the war in Vietnam.

There would be less scolding of the generals when they upset constitutional processes, as they did so flagrantly in Brazil in 1964. And the Brazilian junta, as well as the juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, could parade their anti-communism, and the Johnson administration would recognize the validity of their rule. Compared to Kennedy, Johnson was more tractable in his dealings with the military.

Johnson's credibility in Latin America, which had been unfairly questioned when he inherited the presidency, was very nearly destroyed by the Dominican intervention of 1965. In the previous year, Johnson had handled an explosive situation in Panama, where anti-American riots had erupted in January, 1964, with adroit and skillful maneuvering. He maintained United States prerogatives in the Canal Zone but eventually accepted, in substance, the Panamanian contention that the existing canal arrangement was unfair to Panama and must be changed.

But the Dominican dilemma seemed infinitely more complicated, and Johnson's actions aroused the deepest anti-United States passions throughout Latin America. For at least a year, the rickety framework of Dominican constitutionality had prevailed, despite

buffeting from the left—which looked to former President Juan Bosch as savior—and the right—which placed its ultimate faith in the old business interests and the powerful Dominican military. The revolt that erupted in April, 1965, against the triumvirate headed by Donald Reid Cabral, was not strictly a civilian versus military affair. A segment of the military broke away from the establishment and declared that it was fighting for a return of Dominican democracy, which could come about only with the return of Juan Bosch. Unfortunately, the United States diplomatic corps in the republic, headed by William Tapley Bennett, had few contacts except with the ruling clique, and Bennett's initial reports of the situation reflected the rightist contention that the regime was being threatened by a pro-Communist movement.

What followed seemed to be a nightmarish replay of 1916, when President Woodrow Wilson had ordered an intervention into the Dominican Republic that established a military government and left an indelible mark on Dominican politics. Wilson had been led by his revulsion from chaos and discord and his determination to make the Dominicans obey democratic processes, even at the point of a bayonet. Johnson feared the Communist bogey. Officials scrambled hastily for information and came up with the now-famous "list" of Communists who formed, they said, the crucial core of the rebelling band. On later investigation the inevitable fabrications and duplications of names were discovered, but by then Johnson had already ordered the landing of United States Marines.

In the United Nations and before the American public, the Johnson administration pledged its faith in democracy but warned that it would not allow another "Cuba." Still the United States marshalled barely enough votes in the O.A.S. to "internationalize" the peace-keeping force in the Dominican Republic. Important countries like Chile and Mexico refused to go along with what they claimed was a patent violation of non-interventionist principles. Johnson had first intervened in order to reestablish order, an action recognizable under international

law and probably justified by the circumstances. But ultimately the United States case rested on the theory that another Communist takeover was in the making, and, when that proposition was demolished, Johnson's image in Latin America was deeply scarred. The best that can be said is that, unlike Wilson, Johnson did internationalize the peace-keeping force and he did pull United States troops out.

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

During the Kennedy-Johnson years, the United States military assistance program to Latin America was supposedly altered to counter Communist subversion. Kennedy argued that the Latin American military would not be able to meet external threats to the free world. Instead, it must be revamped and modernized to combat guerrilla activities and to employ its talents in certain civilian efforts which would rebuild public confidence in the military. Two key words were "counterinsurgency" and "civic action," which represented the two aspects of the crusade against communism. To meet the threat, the United States maintained special anti-guerrilla schools in the Canal Zone and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In addition, Latin American police received intensive training in riot control at Fort Davis in the Canal Zone. As for civic action, the military were encouraged to aid civilians in such projects as land redevelopment or waterworks construction.

Presumably, the United States was no longer in the business of supplying Latin American governments with unnecessary military equipment, which in the past had been used to glorify the military establishment or to suppress civil liberties. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara explained in January, 1968, the United States planned to encourage Latin American governments to purchase only that equipment which was vitally necessary to combat immediate threats from guerrillas, and to discourage them from

purchasing large, sophisticated weapons that served no practical military function and drained away desperately needed funds from other sectors of government.

To believe that the United States is not supplying the Latin American military with sophisticated weapons, however, is to be incredibly naive or misinformed. Even Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana (D.), who was one of the more effusive admirers of Trujillo, has caustically criticized certain elements of our military assistance program to Latin America.⁴

Except for scattered guerrilla activities [Ellender wrote] all of Latin America is now at peace, but if we encourage the creation of large military establishments, the question will naturally be asked "Against whom is this military might to be directed?" Since jet fighter planes and tanks are of questionable value in maintaining internal security, good neighbors might conclude that the purchase of these armaments is for use against them, and they will naturally be constrained to increase their own defense structures.

The point Senator Ellender missed is the more likely alternative—that such military equipment can be used against civilian populations. Anti-guerrilla training at Fort Bragg and the Canal Zone is doubtless of great utility in the combatting of internal subversion. One wonders, however, why it was necessary for Latin American countries to spend (from fiscal 1963 to fiscal 1967), millions of dollars on armored personnel carriers, submarines, aircraft, tanks and destroyers. Nor is the United States the sole supplier of Latin America. Great Britain and France have a large military market there. United States Defense Department experts point out that, compared to larger industrial nations, Latin American defense expenditures occupy a relatively small proportion of the national budgets of Latin American countries

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Lester D. Langley has published numerous articles on Latin American affairs. He is the author of *The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968).

⁴ Allen Ellender, *Review of United States Government Operations in Latin America* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 8-9.

This article describes the difference between those Latin American militarists who take over civilian governments because they can do a better job than civilians and those who take over for reasons of political advantage. "Washington's usual insistence that military governments call elections, based on the uncritical assumption that military governments ipso facto are undesirable, plays into the hands of the militarists at the expense of the professionals."

The Latin American Military Elite

BY THOMAS M. MILLINGTON

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SINCE 1959, when J. Lloyd Mecham wrote about "nominal" and "real" constitutions in Latin America, the number of constitutions adopted by the 21 Latin American republics has increased from 186 to 198. Coups and revolutions continue, as does the underlying contradiction noted by the author: "on the one hand apparent devotion to constitutionalism as a cure for national problems, and on the other, lack of respect for constitutional mandates."

Nowhere are constitutions more elaborate and less observed. Politically, Latin Americans seem to be unqualified optimists, for the long succession of constitutional failures has never dampened hopes that the perfect constitution—a cure-all for national ills—will be discovered eventually.¹

Latin American militaries have vested interests in the political sterility of constitutions. So long as there is no real connection between constitutions and political practices, civilian governments are deprived of a potential source of legitimacy. The military, therefore, can present itself as the repository of constitutional legitimacy and it can take upon itself the right to overthrow civilian governments in the name of protecting the con-

stitution. The effective exercise of this "custodianship" of the constitution presupposes the constitutional illegitimacy of civilian government. The development of patterns which strengthen the legitimacy of civilian rule, such as an uninterrupted series of honest elections, undermines the validity of the military's political role.

FACTORS OF THE COUP D'ETAT

Various circumstances have contributed to militarism in Latin America. The lack of any other strong, well-integrated group, the influences exerted by foreign training missions and foreign military ideologies and the fact that Latin American militaries tend often to copy coups staged by one another have been partial causes of the phenomenon of militarism. Edwin Lieuwen has observed:

The militarism of the post-war period, like that of the 1930's, has been principally a reflection of demands made upon the armed forces by antagonistic classes—by the traditional order attempting to maintain the *status quo* and by new social forces attempting to alter it.²

It is also true, though much less noticed, that military politics and military coups are part of the tensions between civilian executives and their military establishments.

It is clear that Latin American militaries do not give exclusive loyalty to the executive, particularly if he is a civilian. Their loyalty

¹ J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real," *Journal of Politics*, May, 1959, p. 258.

² Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 125.

is usually highly contingent. Executives must create new patterns of loyalty and must constantly attempt to widen their margins of support inside the military. The distribution of rewards and punishments inside the military therefore tends to be a political matter.

Within this perspective, the military coup is ultimately a device for reworking the existing patterns of military patronage and power in the military hierarchy.

The unstable relations between the civilian executive and the military establishment are seldom, however, the reason given for any coup. Rather, most coups are given justifications which serve to divert attention from the factor of competition within the military and to reduce as much as possible the friction between groups inside the military.

Certain sectors in the military develop stakes in the perpetuation of political discrepancies which can serve to justify a military coup. For example, one would be mistaken in the case of Argentina to take the anti-*peronismo* of the armed forces at face value. Interventionist sectors in the Argentine military have vested interests in perpetuating *peronismo* because it provides a ready-made excuse for the continuing political activism of the military. *Aprismo* in Peru, *movimentismo* in Bolivia, *vargismo* in Brazil and *comunismo* in virtually all of the Latin American countries except Cuba are similar objects of the military's vested interests.

Discrepancies between executive policies and the "requirements" of nationalism, economic stability and modernization may also become the objects of the vested interests of groups inside the military. Deliberately aggravating these discrepancies, for example by demanding bigger allotments to purchase "prestige" military hardware when the executive faces insolvency and inflation, or increasing nationalistic propaganda when the executive is involved in delicate relations with foreign-owned industries are standard devices.

MILITARY ELITES

There are two ways of preventing military

coups. The first is to develop a reasonably effective political system. The second is to create an authoritarian system based upon controls over the military establishment itself. In either case, the uncertainty of the military's loyalty to the executive is eliminated.

The following countries, with their present presidents, have non-political militaries, established traditions of civilian rule and generally effective political systems: Chile (Eduardo Frei, 1964-1970); Uruguay (Jorge Pacheco Areco, 1967-1971); Mexico (Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, 1965-1970); Costa Rica (Jose Joaquin Trejos, 1966-1970).³

The countries which have non-political militaries by reason of authoritarianism are: Nicaragua (Somoza dynasty, 1936-); Paraguay (General Alfredo Stroessner, 1954-); Haiti (François Duvalier, 1957-); Cuba (Fidel Castro, 1959-); Argentina (Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Onganía, 1966-).

Ranged between these two poles are the rest of the Latin American countries. The countries which are moving away from militarism in the direction of civilian rule are: Venezuela (Rafael Caldera, 1969-1974); Colombia (Carlos Lleras Restrepo, 1966-1970); El Salvador (Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, 1967-1972). These countries had their last military coups in June, 1958 (Venezuela), May, 1957 (Colombia), and October, 1960 (El Salvador).

Those countries which now have civilian presidents but have more recent histories of military coups and are experiencing continuing political instability are, with the date of the last coup given first: Dominican Republic (1963, Joaquin Balaguer, 1966-1970); Ecuador (1966, José Maria Velasco Ibarra, 1968-1972); Guatemala (1963, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, 1966-1970.)

The countries where military coups have put military leaders in power who have subsequently been elected are: Honduras (1963, General Osvaldo Lopez Arellano 1965-1971); Bolivia (1964, General Rene Barrientos Ortuño 1966-1970).

Finally, those countries where the military as an institution seized control of the government and, at this writing, still con-

³ Costa Rica abolished her army in 1948.

tinues running it are: Brazil (1964); Peru (1968); Panama (1968).

"PROFESSIONALISM"

The criterion of professionalism has become increasingly useful in any attempt to describe Latin American military elites. Professionalism can be taken to mean the replacement of the military's traditional preoccupation with custodianship politics by new involvement in areas where the army can make use of its expertise, technical skills and organized manpower. These areas can range from involving the military in running factories (Argentina) to "civic action" programs in the Andean countries and Central America, whereby the military supplies engineers and soldiers to build roads, schools, communications facilities and sanitary projects. Professionalism, as such, is an outgrowth of the fact that the Latin American militaries are receiving better training and can use more sophisticated technology. More flexible patterns of promotion and wider recruitment have tended to undermine the domination of the militaries by a small caste of upper-class officers who traditionally have been the repository of military custodianship. Middle class and *mestizo* elements are beginning to carry more weight among the officer classes.

Finally, professionalism in the military results from the fact that as Latin American societies undergo change and modernization, the militaries are presented with many opportunities to play integrating and constructive roles.

Professionalism is not necessarily an antidote to militarism. On the contrary, because professionalism is by its nature non-ideological and apolitical, it encourages the habit of not speaking out on political questions. As this reluctance spreads, those elements which still espouse political attitudes acquire greater leverage inside of the military simply by default. In times of political crisis, when by

force of habit the military is expected to offer a political response, it is precisely these residual elements, untouched by professionalism, which may speak for the whole military institution. Professionalism, therefore, although it is apolitical, inherently offers no support to any civilian president when the chips are down.

Professionalism avoids politics but it is not necessarily opposed to allowing the military to assume direct control of the government. The new professional commitments to modernization and the higher levels of competence inside the military, for example in the area of public administration, inevitably persuade the military that it can run the government more efficiently than can civilians. The military grows increasingly impatient with the slowness of constitutional processes. Finally, middle-class elements will not necessarily oppose professional militaries who are taking over the government, since the middle class fears that civilian government will gradually tend to come under the control of the larger lower classes. It is therefore willing to exchange political democracy for a military government which represents greater efficiency and less politics in public administration, as well as the ability to take politically unpopular measures (e.g., wage freezes and strike controls) which can create a stable environment for middle-class investments.⁴

It is essential to distinguish between the military in politics and the military in government when discussing the impact of professionalism. The tendency of professional militaries to take over running the government should make one skeptical of distinctions between "the professionals"—the group of officers who hold that the military should refrain from political activities—and the militarists, who insist on playing politics.⁵

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⁴ Cf. José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," in *Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, March, 1965), pp. 55-91.

⁵ Lieuwen, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

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“Despite the ups and downs of international courtships, the United States and Latin America recognize that their common security lies in common defense.”

The Concept of Hemispheric Defense

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SHOULD IT TURN out to be true that historically the United States alternates between degrees of isolationism and transnational involvement, it is fairly predictable that even in the most introverted future cycle we shall continue to view the rest of the Western Hemisphere to the south and east of us as a place from which we should be less isolated than we are from the rest of the world. North Americans have always had a special set of attitudes about what is sometimes called the “Home Hemisphere.” Our inconstant and often insensitive¹ policies toward the Latin American countries, which occupy most of the area under discussion, do not attest the strategic regard we have for them. Fundamentally, the now multilateral version² of the *original*³ unilateral declaration known as the Monroe Doctrine is more expressive of United States hemispheric strategy today than it was in 1823.

¹ Oliver, “Foreign and Human Relations with Latin America,” *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1969, pp. 521-531, 526.

² The President Monroe (original) version of the Monroe Doctrine was made multilateral in 1933.

³ Stress added to distinguish the Roosevelt Corollary of 1905, basing U.S. interventionism on the logic of decency toward the Powers excluded by the original Doctrine from use of force within the Western Hemisphere. It is an important aspect of Inter-American psychodiplomacy to keep in mind that very often in Latin America the semantic referent of “Monroe Doctrine” is the Roosevelt Corollary, now discredited and no longer asserted.

From moment to moment, episode to episode, the sweep of United States security appraisal includes the whole planet. It analyzes the situations in Berlin and Czechoslovakia. It scrutinizes explosive confrontations in the Middle East and Africa. It looks closely at Korea and mainland China. Swinging downward in the Far East, it lingers on Southeast Asia. In all these areas, it sees massed troops, intense national and ethnic hatreds, endemic conflict, and frightening dangers of tragic miscalculations. But swinging on to Latin America, the constant survey sees and reports differently. Cuba is there, still hostile, but contained and tolerably quiet. Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala suffer degrees of internal violence but, contrary to news accounts of United States Special Forces (Green Berets) engaged there, these countries are managing their internal order problems themselves. There are issues, of course, such as the maritime limits and fisheries difficulties on the west coast of South America, but these pose no clear and present threats or use of force. Military juntas have replaced several elected governments (temporarily, if history is to be the basis of prediction). But even in countries where there have been coups, the armed forces continue normal deployment within national territories. Ethnic tensions exist in some countries, but in subdued, intra-

nation form. Fascist ideologies are practically nonexistent, and the Marxists are doctrinally split where there is anything even approaching the discipline that "scientific" commitment to an ideology requires. Latin America, on the world scale, has been and is relatively quiet.

Geographically, Latin America covers about eight million square miles and the two American continents divide the planet from one pole to the shadow of the other. Throughout its length, the Latin American continent enjoys a climate favorable to agriculture. Deep water ports abound along its coasts and every country but one has access to the sea. At the waist of the Americas, the tiny needle's eye that regulates sea transit between the oceans is the most strategically important international waterway in the world.

In terms of world orientation, it is most natural for Latin America to look geographically to the north and politically to the west. Buenos Aires is 5,241 rhumbline miles from Washington, D. C., and 8,389 from Moscow. Santiago, Chile, is 5,930 rhumbline miles from San Francisco, and 11,380 from Peking.

Demographically, almost 250 million people live in the countries of Latin America. Over half of them are less than 18 years old. Now they are restive and impatient people, rich in intellectual resources that are being sharpened through increasing education. Although they are usually intensely nationalistic and sensitive to any foreign influence, their regional orientation is becoming more pronounced as a consequence of travel, communications and the joint consideration of common problems. International relationships and country-to-country appreciations are increasing; the countries are en route to attaining the degree of understanding that exists among the West European nations. This fact foreshadows the development of intraregional arrangements.

The appetite of major economies, combined with the strategic character of world commerce, make possession of or access to natural resources a substantial element of national power. The United States, once lacking little, has now depleted many of its own resources

while feeding an ever greater industrial market. It has become an importer, dependent upon foreign sources. To some degree, it is already dependent on Latin America for strategic requirements. In time of war, this dependence could become critical. Moreover, exploration of the natural resources of Latin America is, as yet, hardly begun. The potential wealth and variety awaiting discovery there are staggering, as are the interlocking economies that can be built upon them. For the United States, the friendly proximity of such sources is a strategic consideration of basic importance.

The Latin American lag in economic development will not be overcome in the near future. The internal factors that drag at the skirts of the Latin American developmental process broaden a gap already being expanded by the progressive pace of more technically sophisticated nations. Even so, of all the less developed regions of the world, Latin America is the most developed, the most advanced, and the most aware of it. Latin America's economic capability in a world of unforeseeable political dispositions cannot be ignored.

The popular United States view of the Latin American political structure is not very penetrating. Stormy political histories, military coups and transitory dictators have tended to obscure the fact that all the continental nations of Latin America are republics. Each one considers itself to be earnestly devoted to the ideal of democratic government; there are no anti-democratic ideologies in common currency. The military establishments are democratically oriented, but many consider themselves as political watch dogs. This, in their view, justifies temporary seizures of power if necessary to correct a bad situation until new elections can be permitted. Some military coups have probably served the cause of genuine democratic progress. Others have been unjustified, inept and harmful to democratic growth. In the recent years of greatest hemispheric progress, however, there has been no instance among the continental countries of the classic *caudillo* whose *golpe* was designed to result in a permanent military dictatorship.

In its general prevalence, the democratic-republican character of Latin America is—despite its ups and downs—an asset of great importance to our hemispheric security.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Because our sense of strategic values accords special status to Latin America, the forces that threaten hemispheric stability warrant the most careful attention of our government. This is in fact the case. Latin America is probably the most studied and analyzed of all the less developed regions in the world. The basic format of the problems that create instability is essentially as follows:

Colonialism in Latin America left behind a system of capital ownership, class distinction and oligarchic influence that even today results in a wide gulf between the privileged and the poor, the powerful and the weak, the complacent and the frustrated.

As long as these extremes were confined to a pastoral environment, the situation was tolerable and reasonably stable. With the disruptive introduction of technology and industry, the picture changed. New employment patterns and increased education sharpened social consciences. The under-privileged man developed a better perspective and a deeper resentment.

In search of a solution, the underprivileged man has turned to his government, and he finds it difficult to understand why the government cannot help him more effectively. The trouble is that the government also has problems. The conservative oligarchy remains a powerful political influence in most Latin American countries. Revenues are meager; debts are large; and the rate of population growth approximates the percentage increase in Gross National Product. The slender margin of saved social capital, if there is any, must be distributed among social and economic needs with a degree of inadequacy that leaves every sector insufficiently supported and vocally disappointed.

Given the consequent unrest, the agitator, with his typically Marxist invective and his promises, finds elements easily led to dissidence. This classic pattern has led to active

Communistic or nihilistic insurgency in several Latin American countries and to the threat of such insurgency in most of them.

The actual or incipient problem of internal security adds greatly to the dilemma of government, today in the country, tomorrow in the cities. Successful social and economic programs cannot flourish amid strife, bloodshed and disruptive changes of national administration. Reasonable internal order is an administrative imperative. Accordingly, governments must invest in public force monopolies that can insure a peaceful environment for the application of social reforms, and for the public and private investment confidence essential to economic growth.

The assurance of reasonable public order entails expenditures for the forces required to maintain the peace. This draws on the same meager revenues that must be applied to other objectives. The search for that magic monetary ratio that will strike a proper balance between internal security and national development is a perennial budgetary and planning agony. As ministers contend and parliaments haggle, the United States is a deeply interested—and not always silent—observer.

Our government is very close to the internal operations of some of the Latin American governments. It has been closer to others. This is both resented and welcomed for a wide range of reasons, some cogent, some wide of the mark. United States assistance, both advisory and material, is offered when it improves the capability of government to attain its developmental objectives. Even such a goal is rejected by the ultra-right and extreme left.

With regard to military assistance, the aim of the United States is the same as that of the host country: to associate such aid primarily with development. The United States is willing to invest some assistance funds in Latin American countries to achieve this aim. Such an objective is not without an element of altruism, but it is also based on strategic professionalism. A Latin American country faced with a level of insurgency that it could not control with its own armed forces could con-

front the United States with a most serious problem. Thus, as well as advancing development, our military assistance has a preventive purpose. Additionally, our strategic planners measure the Latin American rate of growth. They chart its potential, and they see a giant of tomorrow. Good strategic planning entails the cultivation of friendships that will survive the current era and flourish in the next one.

The size and the nature of our Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Latin America are often misunderstood, if not misrepresented. MAP falls into three major categories: military materiel, training and civic action.

The military materiel program (which many persons mistakenly believe to be the whole of MAP) is the provision of hardware items. These are weapons (usually small arms), vehicles (usually trucks and jeeps), communications equipment, aircraft, naval vessels (usually smaller ones), tools, spare parts and other items employed by the military. Military materiel assistance takes the form either of grant aid or military sales, or both, depending on the financial position of the assisted country. Within each country, target levels are established. These are gauged to the size and geographic character of the country, the nature of the internal security threat and the forces required to manage it.

In recent years, Congress has successively reduced the permissible limit of military materiel assistance that can be provided to Latin America. The current limit for the entire Hemisphere is \$75 million per year. This ceiling covers sales as well as grant aid. The grant aid portion of this limitation may not exceed \$25 million and the actual program (which is well short of this maximum permissible sum) goes mostly for upkeep, not for new items. The short-term outlook is for continued reductions. However, the Department of State, having executive responsibility

for all foreign aid programs, can reassess the need for grant military assistance at any time and recommend such programs as it and the Department of Defense consider to be wise.

There are popular criticisms of military materiel assistance for Latin America. It is charged that MAP arms Latin American military officers to overthrow constitutional governments. This is false, both as to the intention and as to the effect. Any armed force can overthrow any civil government. United States-supplied weapons have nothing to do with it. They may be the visible weapons of the armed force, but pikes or fowling pieces would be just as effective if there were no armed opposition.

It is also alleged that United States-provided arms may tempt Latin American countries to attack each other. This is probably false. In the main, there is stable peace among and between the Latin American countries. Even where the scars of old disputes still itch, effective restraints are imposed by a general lack of adequate military resources, the relative power of the potential disputants, massive terrain barriers, or all these factors combined.

Finally, some critics maintain that the United States is supplying the Latin American nations with armed forces which they cannot afford to maintain. This is true, not absolutely but to the extent that few of them can maintain any military establishment without losses of social or economic development opportunities. Yet, as already pointed out, they cannot afford the risks of having no armed forces. United States policy in this regard has been to calculate and support the most economically adequate military force. Congress imposes conditions of eligibility for the provision of defense articles (military hardware) which are applicable to all the Latin American countries; these conditions embrace sale and credit guarantees, as well as grant aid.

First of all, the United States may not provide, through grant aid or sales, any sophisticated weapons such as missile systems or military jet aircraft⁴ to any Latin American country. Economic assistance under the For-

⁴ Although the legislative history is murky, this probably means "sophisticated jet aircraft," not covering light trainers and transports propelled by reaction engines.

ign Assistance Act must be withheld in an amount equal to the amount spent by any less developed country for the acquisition of sophisticated weapons systems from any country. (The President may make exceptions to both the above restraints when he considers it important to the security of the United States to do so.⁵)

Second, development assistance shall be terminated when such assistance is being diverted to military expenditures or when a recipient country is diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with development.⁶

In effect, by economic leverage, the United States seeks to curb the military hardware appetites of the Latin American countries. This policy is not popular in Latin America where it is seen as arrogant and intrusive. There is little evidence that any Latin American nation seeks military modernization on a scale that would justify international alarm, but each nation considers its prerogative to establish its own military needs to be a matter of sovereign inviolability. Since these United States restraints have been imposed, Latin American military purchases from third country sources have substantially increased.

Our military assistance to the countries of Latin America has by no means been confined to the instruments of war. Training and civic action assistance are major elements of the overall program.

Training for Latin American personnel, under the Military Assistance Program, has a unique strategic value which Congress recognizes by excluding training costs from the \$75 million (sales and grants) limitation placed on hardware. The range of training activities is comprehensive. At the upper level,

ministers of defense and general officers visit the United States for meetings with key United States officers and orientation tours in the United States. Tours and briefings are also provided for officers of lesser rank on a group basis. The Chiefs of Staff of the American Armies, Navies and Air Forces meet in an international conference held each year in a different country to address common problems and to seek common solutions. When held in the United States, these conferences are MAP funded. Promising senior officers attend high level military schools in the United States. The most prestigious of these is the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., which is a graduate level institution for both United States and Latin American officers and is on a par with the United States National War College.

Latin American personnel receive training at other schools in the United States (in English) or in the Canal Zone (in Spanish or Portuguese) covering a broad range of military subjects.

In addition to the skills they teach, many of which are applicable to civil pursuits, the training programs create an international community of friends⁷ and contribute to hemispheric cooperation and better understanding. The apolitical character of the United States military services has an impressive demonstration effect on many Latin American students. When it is considered that, within the career spans of men still in uniform, our United States service schools have graduated over 40,000 Latin American students, it becomes apparent that vast benefits have been derived from our training programs in terms of both skills and international friendships.

Civic action, the third aspect of the United States Military Assistance Program, played a major role in the United States when the United States Army contributed to the opening and early development of the West. In Latin America, this same role is played by all of the services. The in-country United States Military Groups work hand in hand in this operation with USAID which assists in funding. Latin American army engineers span rivers and build roads into remote areas,

⁵ Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (as amended in 1968), Secs. 504 (a), 620 (v); Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA), Sec. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, FAA, Sec. 620(s) and FMSA, Sec. 35.

⁷ In common with many other observers of Latin American mores, we believe that "amistad" (friendship) is a very powerful factor toward effective joint achievement. We do not support the desirability, and we reject the actuality, of "amistades" between "our" military and "theirs" designed to undercut democratic values. We have not seen this in our experience.

freeing farmers from isolation and bringing them into the pattern of national commerce. They construct rural schools and dispensaries. The Latin American air forces and navies advance the colonization of empty lands by means of transportation and technical assistance. They bring in and supply doctors and school teachers, and they maintain the linkage of supply essential to the support of new and remote communities. All of the armed services use their own facilities to teach skills and to provide the services that advance the pace and broaden the front of social and economic progress. Throughout the Latin American countries, the machinery, the skills and the personnel of the armed forces engaged in civic action projects represent very large organized contributions to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

Integral to any policy treatment of Latin America is the question of military intervention. Is intervention necessary and, if not, how can the United States maintain its own security in the event of hostile inroads within the Hemisphere?

Current policy regarding intervention was

⁸ Some Latin critics, of course, would count even the expression of an honest opinion by the United States Government related to its interests as a form of "intervention," given the presence and preponderance of a great array of U. S. sociological influences. See, also, the discussion of "imperialism" in Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 525-26.

⁹ The accurate characterization of "blown" clandestine involvement, as at the Bay of Pigs, or—outside the Americas—in the U-2 admission by President Eisenhower, is still unclear, lying as it does in what one distinguished American called "the underworld of international relations." A very hopeful aspect of the Bay of Pigs "military intervention" (if it is to be called that) is that the United States did not follow through, precisely because of a disinclination to being publicly involved in a use of force now illicit under the United Nations Charter as well as within the norms of the Inter-American system.

¹⁰ See the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

¹¹ And the political costs to the United States in the long memories of the sensitive Latin American peoples are very high. These political costs are now payable at home, too.

¹² The "ultra-legalistic" refusals of certain Latin American countries to accept the concept of limited, evolutionary growth for the O.A.S. Charter puts the Inter-American system at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to the capabilities (for effectiveness and for corrosive political adventurism) in the United Nations Organization.

first formulated in 1933 when, at the Seventh Inter-American Conference in Montevideo, Secretary of State Cordell Hull accepted the principle of non-intervention. This policy was strengthened in 1936 at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, when the United States subscribed without reservation to the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention. This Protocol states, in part, that:

The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties.

Evidence can be forwarded that the United States, in the years since 1963, has occasionally been guilty of non-military interventions⁸ in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. Militarily, however, we have been faithful to our promise—almost.⁹

The traditional motives for unilateral military intervention no longer apply. The heady arrogance of Manifest Destiny has subsided with United States maturity. The political and economic myopia of "Dollar Diplomacy" has been replaced by a more sensible policy. The self-appointed role of unilateral arbiter¹⁰ in the internal power struggles of the Latin American countries expired with the realization that it was politically counterproductive. Time and adjustment to the experience and lessons of living with the Latin American countries have taught us that intervention unravels more than it knits.¹¹

Does this mean that we would never again, under any circumstances, intervene in the internal affairs of a sister republic of the Americas? It is unlikely that we shall be confronted with such a unilateral decision. The accepted justification for intervention in the present era is the imminent danger of an external Communist takeover of a besieged democratic government, and the United States is not alone in the view that such a threat to the Hemisphere warrants defense action. Effective instrumentalities for the full acceptance of collective responsibilities for such action remain to be developed.¹²

HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE

In his embittered retirement, Simon Bolivar surveyed the wreckage of his dreams and compared the effort of organizing American states to the futility of "ploughing the sea." Through blind eyes of stone, the Liberator now looks down on the delegates to the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Defense Board as they contend with the same elusive problem. The Inter-American Defense Board (I.A.D.B.) was formed in 1942, and seated in Washington, D.C., where it continues today to meet in formal convention twice each month. The formation of the I.A.D.B. was authorized by the Declaration of Havana (1940) which announced the principle of collective defense. Its functions, as subsequently defined by the O.A.S., charge it with "preparing as vigorously as possible, and keeping up to date, in close liaison with the governments through their respective delegations, the military planning of the common defense."

The I.A.D.B. is not the Advisory Defense Council described in the O.A.S. Charter. Neither is it an institution of the O.A.S., although its operations are now funded under the budgetary provisions of the charter. It is a defense planning organization, responsive to but not part of the O.A.S. Its 18 active delegations (Costa Rica currently has no delegate) confer and vote on collective defense resolutions in consultation with their respective governments. The delegates are high military officials of the national armed services. The board, however, cannot act on its approved resolutions. These are passed to the O.A.S., where they are available as guidance to the members and the organs of the O.A.S. as a basis for collective security action as needed. Logically, the defense planning documents of the I.A.D.B. would serve as the basis for the recommendations of the Advisory Defense Committee if it were convened. As a practical matter of need and convenience, it is probable that the board would serve as a subordinate staff and secretariat to the Ad-

visory Defense Committee if security considerations were such as to confront the O.A.S. with defense problems requiring convention of the A.D.C. and extended consultation and planning.

Of the 92 resolutions passed by the I.A.D.B. council of delegates since 1942¹³ many are still awaiting approval by one or more of the member governments. Some deal with sensitive, complex or expensive matters such as intelligence and standardization agreements. At the heart of all I.A.D.B. planning is, however, the "General Military Plan for the Defense of the Continent" which enjoys the unanimous approval of all nations represented on the board.

The I.A.D.B. normally sends an invited observer to major military exercises and conferences concerned with Latin American security. The board also supervises the Inter-American Defense College and provides curricular guidance. Within such guidance, the college operates in academic freedom.

Consistent with a general movement in the direction of collective security in Latin America is CONDECA (Conference for the Defense of Central America). The Central American countries have more in common than do most other regional segments of the Americas. As small nations occupying the same region, once a single state, they have a natural sense of kinship. None has the resources to contend with a serious security threat, and each would be deeply affected by the impact of a major military operation in the other. All are proximate to Cuba and

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Walter A. Guntharp served as Chief of Military Assistance for the Latin American Armies from 1964-1965, and as Commander, U.S. Military Group, Colombia. He serves on the Inter-American Defense Board and writes frequently on military themes.

Covey T. Oliver has alternated service in the State Department with the teaching of law since 1942. He was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1967 to January, 1969.

¹³ IADB Resolutions, Document T-309, prepared by the staff of the Inter-American Defense Board, Dec. 31, 1968.

BOOK REVIEWS

CUBA: CASTRO AND COMMUNISM.

By Andrés Suárez. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969, paper. 249 pages and index, \$2.45.)

Andrés Suárez, a Cuban now at the University of Florida, has written a fascinating account of Fidel Castro's revolution. To a North American, the Alice in Wonderland aspects of the events described in these pages are mind-boggling. The recurrent debate—was Castro a Communist during his Sierra Maestra days?—is effectively settled in these pages. Suárez also explains why Castro finally elected to become a Communist and describes Cuba's relations with the U.S.S.R., China and the Latin American revolutionaries.

Ernst Halperin has provided a thoughtful foreword.

O.E.S.

THE POLITICS OF WAR: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1943-1945. By GABRIEL KOLKO. (New York: Random House, 1968. 626 pages, notes and index, \$12.95.)

Gabriel Kolko, Professor of History at the State University of New York at Buffalo, is blunt to the point of rudeness. He tells it (as his students would say) "like it is"—or rather as he thinks it is. The book is at once obviously biased and very interesting.

Kolko takes a fresh look at events during the later years of World War II; he sweeps across the map of Europe and Asia giving the back of his hand to all and sundry. His blows land rather more viciously on the political right and center than on the left. American policymakers, to Kolko, were either reactionary or stupid—and often both. The Communists were usually reasonable and always misunderstood.

The reader who can read between, around and through the biases will gain some valuable insights from this book.

O.E.S.

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. By HANS J. MORGENTHAU. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Preface, 244 pages and index, \$6.95.)

Professor Morgenthau has written a cogent plea for a foreign policy of common sense. He depicts the United States as the world's most powerful nation, ready to fight against imperialist expansion (which he indicates we should do) and against distasteful ideas (which he feels we should not and cannot do).

"The only standard by which a sound foreign policy must be informed is not moral or philosophic opposition to communism as such, but the bearing a particular communism in a particular country has upon the interests of the United States."

O.E.S.

THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. By ROBERT F. KENNEDY. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969. 224 pages, documents and index, \$5.50.)

We are all indebted to Robert F. Kennedy for his account, published posthumously, of the *Thirteen Days* of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In the narrative, presented simply, the drama heightens on each page. The cast is well-known, but the reader will be interested in Robert Kennedy's description of the position and prescriptions of the participants, in the slim threads on which war and peace hung, and in the promise ended by an assassin's bullet. This is a powerful book. No one concerned with survival in a nuclear age should miss it; no one who studies or writes of world politics can ignore its unmistakable lesson: in an era harnessed to the incredible potential of technology, it is still man who disposes.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
The University of Pennsylvania

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro

On August 30, 1947, at the Inter-American Defense Conference at Petropolis, Brazil, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was unanimously approved by the 19 republics attending the Conference. This treaty established the basis for our subsequent military commitments to Latin America. Excerpts follow:

ARTICLE 1

The high contracting parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to threat or use force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this treaty.

ARTICLE 2

As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding article, the high contracting parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement and endeavor to settle such controversies among themselves by means of procedures in force in the inter-American system before referring them to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 3

1. The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any states against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all the American states and consequently each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. On the request of the state or states directly attacked and until the decision of the organ of consultation of the inter-American system, each one of the contracting parties may determine immediate measures which it may individually adopt in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The organ of consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining these measures and agreeing upon measures of a collective character that should be adopted.

3. The provisions of this article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place

within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American state. When an attack takes place outside the said areas the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.

4. The measures of self-defense provided under this article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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ARTICLE 6

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American state should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an intra-continental or extra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the organ of consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.

ARTICLE 7

In the case of a conflict between two or more American states, without prejudice to the right of self defense in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the high contracting parties, meeting in consultation, shall call upon the contending states to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the status quo ante bellum, and shall take in addition all other necessary measures to re-establish or maintain inter-American peace and security and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. The rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and in the application of the measures which the consultative meeting may agree upon.

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THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY ELITE

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A good criterion in distinguishing among the military elites involved in coups is the question of elections. The quick promise to call elections suggests that the military has taken over the government for political reasons, not because it feels that it can run the government better than civilians. Militarism is likely to be a predominant influence. The non-call of elections, as in the last coups in Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Panama, suggest that the military is interested in running the government and that elements of professionalism are operative. Washington's usual insistence that military governments call elections, based on the uncritical assumption that military governments *ipso facto* are undesirable, plays into the hands of the militarists at the expense of the professionals.

U.S. POLICY AND MILITARY ELITES

A structural discrepancy exists in the administration of United States foreign assistance to Latin America: one arm is civilian and the other is military.

The Secretary of State is responsible for all foreign assistance programs, including military assistance programs (MAP). The responsibility for non-military assistance to Latin America is delegated to the Agency for International Development (AID) in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. Below these offices is the Office of Development, Planning and Programs, the actual coordinator of the activities of AID "desk men" and "in country" missions.

The administration of MAP is put in charge of the Department of Defense, where operational responsibility is given to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (A.S.D./I.S.A.) and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.). Previously, operational responsibility beneath I.S.A. and J.C.S. was entrusted to the ser-

vice departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Since 1958, however, this operational responsibility for MAP has been given to regional Unified Commands. For Latin America, operational responsibility is in the hands of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), based at Quarry Heights in the Panama Canal Zone, which gets technical personnel and logistical support from the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The last in the chain of command are the Military Assistance Advisor Groups (M.A.A.G.), which are stationed in individual Latin American countries. The USSOUTHCOM serves as an intermediary between M.A.A.G.'s and the Department of Defense. Its Commander in Chief is responsible for the administration of MAP throughout Latin America and for supplying M.A.A.G.'s with mobile training teams, technical assistance and logistical support. USSOUTHCOM also runs the School of Americas, to train Latin American military personnel in the Panama Canal Zone. Its efforts are complemented in this respect by the United States Army-run schools at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Camp Gordon, Georgia.

With the recognition, in the early 1960's, that internal subversion, and not external aggression, was the main threat to Latin America, United States military assistance in the area has come into line with the objectives of democratic government envisaged in the Alliance for Progress. Thus, the support for military dictatorships, which was implicit in its original, monolithic emphasis on hemispheric security against external attack, has given way to new emphases on developing the civic action and counterinsurgency capabilities of Latin American militaries. Both are deemed to be ways of converting the military into an enlightened, progressive force while allowing it to be responsible for maintaining a stable environment in which democratic government can function. Hence, military assistance is supposed to dovetail with the efforts of AID teams.

Despite this apparent congruity, the fact remains that United States foreign assistance

to Latin America is administered by two operationally different mechanisms which have their own respective constituent elites in the Latin American countries. Thus, the M.A.A.G.'s remain in touch with United States-trained and-subsidized military elites while the AID teams remain in touch with the United States-subsidized civilian elites. Under local conditions of political stress, there are no guarantees that these military elites will remain loyal to the civilian government.

As previously noted, their stakes in professionalism do not necessarily strengthen their loyalties in that direction. On the contrary, they may be in the forefront of a movement to take over the government. Knowing that the United States Embassy and the AID team will be opposed, these military elites can nevertheless hope that their contacts with the M.A.A.G. mission will prevent United States aid from being cut off in the event of a coup.

A final, general observation can be made. United States military assistance may not only show itself in the conflicts between civilian and military elites, but in countries having larger military establishments, it may add another dimension to the conflicts caused by professionalism inside the military itself. If the United States subsidies contribute to the formation of new professional elites, non-professional groups will be able to oppose them on the grounds of nationalism, which has a strong basis in Latin American militaries.

The reaction of these "nationalistic" groups will become acute as United States military assistance is diverted from "prestige" military hardware, which is their stock in trade, toward the professional groups in the military. This reaction can take the form of abrupt demands upon the civilian executive to give military allotments for the purchase of "prestige" hardware, in order to compensate for the diversion of United States military assistance funds. In short, United States military assistance may tend to aggravate the tendency of professionalism to create discrepant elites inside the military.

THE ERA OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR

(Continued from page 332)

Japan's alignment with Germany and Italy exposed the Panama Canal's Pacific approaches to potential danger. At first, the Latins rebuffed demands for base facilities, but after Pearl Harbor and the advent of Lend Lease, resistance melted. By 1942, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, Panama and Ecuador had provided bases, causing one pundit to suggest that while Columbus discovered America in 1492, the United States discovered Latin America in 1942.¹⁴

In its quest for security against the virus of Axis "isms," the United States embraced several of the twentieth century's most venal dictators. Lest he become "a victim of totalitarian influences," Fulgencio Batista was invited to Washington where Roosevelt, Hull and others lavished attention on him. There the Cuban strong-man promised to "cling to democratic principles."¹⁵ When President Somoza of Nicaragua arrived in Washington in 1939, Roosevelt himself went to Union Station to greet the visiting dignitary, for whom a military parade was held. A year later, the red carpet was rolled out for General Trujillo, the Dominican despot, whose ventures included bribery, murder and graft. Although the President also welcomed democratic leaders to the White House, the *abrazos* tendered Batista, Somoza and Trujillo suggested that the United States government was allergic only to European and Asian totalitarianism, and Haya de la Torre barbed Roosevelt as "The Good Neighbor of tyrants." The truth was that the Axis dictators posed a menace to the United States; the strutting generals of the Hemisphere did not.

The Good Neighbor policy succeeded with flying colors in attaining its principal objective: the promotion of immediate United States economic and security interests. De-

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¹⁴ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (7th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1964), p. 753.

¹⁵ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

THE CONCEPT OF HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE

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recognize that the subversion agents and guerrilla forces of communism respect borders only as sanctuaries.

CONDECA is new on the defense organizational scene, having first been formed in 1964. Its progress has been rapid and especially well directed. It operates with an international military staff, seated in Guatemala City. It plans and holds regular field and command post exercises which are resulting in ever smoother and more effective cooperation.

The Central American states are not the only Latin American states that participate in combined military exercises. There are, periodically, large-scale maneuver-type operations held in Latin America in which the United States and the Latin American countries cooperate in the planning and execution phases.

OBSTACLES TO HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE

A permanent Inter-American Peace Force (I.A.P.F.) would, by any name, be a NATO-type military organization. The attitude of Congress with regard to such a security body is expressed as follows:

It is the sense of Congress that an important contribution toward peace would be made by the establishment under the Organization of American States of an international military force.¹⁴

The sense of Congress in this matter is not easy to implement. It is generally agreed, in principle, that the concept of a permanent inter-American military organization, patterned on the military arm of NATO, has merit. There are, however, impediments that retard its formation.

In our security relationships with the Latin American nations, the United States observes the principles of partnership. Combined exercise planning, for example, is accomplished by international military staffs wherein each participating nation is responsible for some key phase.

¹⁴ FAA, as amended, 1961, Sec. 501, (Policy Statement).

Command in exercise play may reside with any country. The Inter-American Peace Force (I.A.P.F.) in the Dominican Republic was under Brazilian command, giving evidence that in a genuine emergency situation the United States will subordinate its military forces to the principle of collective defense. Our search for partnership rather than dominance is also apparent in rotational conferences of the armies, navies and air forces, where agendas and resolutions are a function of majority, as they are on the Inter-American Defense Board.

A permanent Inter-American military force would entail the commitment of member nations to provide military elements. There are hazards to this. Force contributions would involve national commitments of readiness, i.e., personnel levels, plus training and equipment standards. The member nations would be subject to participation in costly I.A.P.F. exercises. This could lead to an increased and possibly precarious dependence on additional United States military assistance.

The O.A.S. responded to the wishes of the United States Congress in the case of the 1965 Dominican Republic disturbance. It approved an I.A.P.F. under Brazilian command. Paraguay, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Brazil and the United States furnished military contingents. The force was disbanded in 1966 after it had succeeded in restoring peace and had made possible the election of a democratic government. A United States effort to preserve the I.A.P.F. concept for other possible contingencies met with failure.

In the earlier Cuban military crisis, the O.A.S., in a provisional Organ of Consultation, invoked articles six and eight of the Rio Treaty, thus notifying the Soviet Union that the Americas agreed unanimously that the emplacement of offensive weapons in Cuba was an act of aggression. Positive military measures were undertaken by countries in South and Central America. The courage and determination reflected by this collective response combine with the Dominican Republic example to prove that common defense is a real and substantial principle in the American community.

Even so, a permanent I.A.P.F. is not an early probability. The overwhelming military preeminence of the United States cannot be ignored in a consideration of the command structure of such force. Obviously the United States capability to provide the essential military sophistication to an effective force would suggest a powerful United States voice in any command arrangement. The United States has, in addition, the only long-line communications capability adequate to exercise command and control over the multinational military force.

These factors place the Latin American nations in a disadvantageous position in seeking to support a contention that command of an I.A.P.F. should reside with any country other than the United States.

Nonetheless, the concept of collective security remains alive and progress continues. In the years since World War II, both Latin America and the United States have moved ahead in this field with a degree of speed and success that would have been viewed as incredible by the diplomats and generals of 1930. Despite the ups and downs of international courtships, the United States and Latin America recognize that their common security lies in common defense.

MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: 1960-1968

(Continued from page 351)

(for example, such expenditures total 55 per cent in the U.S., 24 per cent in France and 13 per cent in Latin America), and that some military governments are really forces for stability and democracy.

But Congress, which in the past barely blinked at defense budgets, had become skeptical of this contention by 1968. Why, some congressmen asked, was it necessary for Chile (which has one of the more enlightened governments in Latin America) to purchase \$21 million in British aircraft while spending only

\$8.6 million on education; or for Peru to buy about \$26 million worth of British and French planes while reports showed that the average Peruvian caloric intake was well below normal; or for Brazil to ask for \$30 million to \$50 million for planes when 60 per cent of the population was illiterate?⁵

There is, of course, an inherent fallacy in the argument of some critics of United States military policy in Latin America. The United States, they argue, is directly to blame for the failure of democracy, the resurgence of militarism and the tragedy of the Alliance for Progress. In fact, the hard realities are that totalitarianism, militarism and social and economic stagnation persist despite our vigorous application of resources. The tragedy of the Kennedy-Johnson policies in Latin America, which in many ways struck out boldly and imaginatively against the status quo, is that the troubles of the rest of the Hemisphere are too entrenched and too pervasive to be removed overnight.

THE U.S. IN LATIN AMERICA TO 1933

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The deep interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the conflicts with Mexicans took place during the administration of Woodrow Wilson. At first sight this seems most surprising, for Wilson had been highly critical of the big stick and dollar diplomacy of his Republican predecessors, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. In his notable Mobile Address of 1913 he had made a strong bid for Latin American confidence and friendship, with assurances that the United States would henceforth treat Latin Americans as equals and respect their sovereignty. Moreover, in the years in which the deepest interventions began, Wilson was trying to persuade the Latin Americans to join the United States in adopting his Pan American Pact, a rudimentary regional security arrangement providing, among other things, for reciprocal guarantees of the independence and territorial integrity of the signatories. Only Latin American opposition,

⁵ For statistics and analyses of U.S. military assistance to Latin America, see Simon Hanson, "The Alliance for Progress: the Sixth Year—the Military," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Winter, 1968, pp. 75-91.

principally from Chile, prevented its adoption.

Nevertheless, Wilson's apparent inconsistency was understandable. Even more than most United States leaders at that time, he had a sense of his country's "civilizing mission"; he particularly wanted to "teach the Latin Americans to elect good governments"; and Haiti and the Dominican Republic, close to the United States and strategically important to it, seemed from their history to be particularly in need of such instruction. A major feature of both interventions was the establishment of a constabulary or national police force trained by the United States military to create a favorable environment for good government by promoting domestic peace and stability. (Out of the Dominican constabulary, incidentally, emerged Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, that country's dictator from 1930 to 1961.)

In each case, too, special factors helped to explain the intervention. In the Dominican case, for example, the very limited fiscal intervention of 1905 broadened over the years by a seemingly inexorable process that reached its natural culmination in 1916. World War I had begun in 1914 and these two interventions were due in some measure to considerations of national security. Pro-Germans were active in both countries and it was feared that the German government might try to establish submarine bases in their ports. Appropriately, the United States interventions were administered by the Navy and policed by its land force, the Marines. Hence Haiti's new constitution of 1918 was drafted by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt; at any rate, he later said he drafted it, boasting that it was "a pretty good constitution."

In the postwar reaction of the 1920's, United States military involvement in Latin America was checked and somewhat reduced, though not completely ended. In the presidential campaign of 1920 the successful Republican candidate, Warren G. Harding, promised there would be no more "unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little republics of the Western Hemisphere."

sphere." Only in the Dominican Republic was the promise fully kept. There the military occupation came to an end in 1924. In Haiti, it continued for another ten years. In Nicaragua, the Marines were withdrawn briefly, only to be sent back in the face of new disturbances and the alleged threat of Communist subversion operating from Mexico. Yet at the end of the decade it was clear that the tide of intervention had begun to recede. Herbert Hoover's administration (1929-1933) planned and began the elimination of armed intervention completed by Franklin Roosevelt under the aegis of the Good Neighbor policy.

Why this reversal? The main reason seems to be that from the end of World War I to the rise of Adolph Hitler and the formation of the Axis in the 1930's, the United States faced no foreign threat to its security in Latin America and indeed had no serious rival there. Germany, which had loomed large both as a rival and as a threat from the turn of the century to World War I, lost not only that war but her army and navy as well and remained a military cipher throughout the 1920's. The only potentially serious rival, Great Britain, was still deferring to the United States where Hemisphere security was concerned, although she kept and even increased her economic stake in Latin America. Accordingly, at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, Great Britain joined with the United States and the other principal naval powers of the world in adopting a treaty under which sea power—long a British monopoly—was divided on a regional basis, with the Western Hemisphere region allocated to the United States. Moreover, in its primary defense zone, the Caribbean, the United States had two bastions of strength: the completed (1914) and fortified Panama Canal Zone at one end, and the Guantánamo naval base at the other; and it had a navy second to none.

For these and other reasons the United States in the 1920's was so secure in the Western Hemisphere that it no longer felt the need to intervene by force in the countries to the south for its own security. It was also increasingly disillusioned with the results of its

interventions as a "civilizing mission," for they seemed to be doing more harm than good. Moreover, they were a form of military involvement that implied commitment—a commitment to protect the countries intervened in. As an escape from these embarrassments, the United States at last came to accept the inter-American rule of nonintervention long sought by the Latin Americans. But hardly had it done so, in December, 1933, when—most unexpectedly—a grave new threat to Hemisphere security began to emerge, mainly from the rearmed and aggressive Germany of Hitler. In meeting the new threat in new ways and through new channels, the United States found it necessary to make unprecedented commitments, which led, in World War II, to a larger military involvement in Latin America than ever before.

THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD

(Continued from page 345)

This accumulated resentment was vented against Vice President Richard Nixon during his good will tour of eight South American nations in April and May, 1958. The American people and the government were shocked when Nixon was spat upon in Lima and when his motorcade was attacked by an irate mob in Caracas.

In a real sense, the violence displayed toward Vice President Nixon accomplished more than all the polished rhetoric of Latin American orators at inter-American meetings in the previous decade. While the "agonizing reappraisal" of its position in Latin America brought no abrupt reversal of policy, the United States government did begin, soon and seriously, to reexamine Latin American proposals for solutions to Hemisphere problems. Within a few months Milton Eisenhower was sent as a presidential emissary to solicit the views of Central American leaders, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Brazil to discuss President Juscelino Kubitschek's Operation Pan America, which inspired the Alliance for Progress. The United States was moving progressively closer to the Latin American position. This was

demonstrated in September, 1958, at an informal gathering of Hemisphere foreign ministers in Washington, when it was decided to give the Organization of American States responsibility, through a new Committee of Twenty-One, to elaborate plans for broad economic and social development throughout Latin America. The United States, moreover, withdrew its objections to a new lending agency, which was chartered the following year and began operations as the Inter-American Development Bank late in 1960.

During the last two and one-half years of the Eisenhower administration there were frequent inter-American meetings to plan and execute measures for economic cooperation. The most significant of these was the meeting of the Committee of Twenty-One at Bogotá in September, 1960. Its principal document, the Act of Bogotá, called for a concerted attack on the economic and social causes of underdevelopment, and provided for substantial economic assistance through the Inter-American Development Bank to countries willing to enact meaningful economic and social reforms. The United States pledged an initial \$500 million to underwrite the program—the same sum mentioned at Bogotá 12 years earlier. The impact of the offer was offset by congressional delay in appropriating the authorized funds. Nonetheless, after years of fruitless and acrimonious disagreement over economic policies, the United States and Latin America had achieved a broad consensus and a note of optimism that would soon be expressed in the Alliance for Progress.

But while economic relations were improving, political crises in the Caribbean in the late 1950's exposed the limitations of the Hemisphere security system and the contradictions between equally binding obligations assumed by the American republics. Situations that appeared clearly to call for collective action to resist the advance of communism were vigorously opposed on the grounds that collective action would violate the principles of non-intervention and the right of the people of each country freely to determine their form of government. Appeals for con-

certed efforts against right-wing dictatorships to defend human rights and the principle of representative democracy ran counter to the principle of non-intervention and the long-standing Hemisphere agreement to recognize *de facto* regimes regardless of the manner in which they acquired and exercised power.

Within months after seizing power in 1959, the Castro government sponsored or permitted attacks on four neighboring republics (Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) by revolutionaries armed and trained in Cuba. All failed; but the situation could not be ignored. To deal with the unrest in the Caribbean, the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers was convoked in Santiago, Chile, August 12-18, 1959. The meeting produced one of the loftiest statements yet devised in praise of representative democracy, and issued a condemnation of dictatorships, but authorized no action to reprimand violators of the rules of the inter-American community.

In view of the rapid conversion of Cuba into a police state and its open alignment with the Soviet Union, the United States sought inter-American action to deal with this threat to Hemisphere security. At the same time Dominican-Venezuelan relations deteriorated further, and were climaxed by the Dominican-sponsored attempt on the life of President Romulo Betancourt in June, 1960. In these circumstances the American governments agreed to hold two successive Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Sixth and Seventh, at San José, Costa Rica, in August.

The Sixth Meeting condemned the Dominican Republic for aggression and intervention in Venezuela and, for the first time, approved sanctions against the aggressor, in this case severing diplomatic relations and suspending all trade in arms. The Seventh Meeting denounced the intervention of international communism in the Hemisphere, but voted no sanctions and did not specify Cuba in its final resolution.

In effect, Castro was given a free hand and the United States was reminded that no inter-American agreement is ever stronger than the will of the American republics to enforce it.

In 1960, the American republics were willing to invoke the Rio Treaty against a tyranny of the right, but a majority of the Latin American governments refused to recognize a tyranny of the left as a threat to the security of the Hemisphere. The machinery for inter-American cooperation in the common interest existed, but obviously it could not be relied upon always to protect the national security of the United States.

THE ERA OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR

(Continued from page 365)

spite several oil disputes and the renunciation of armed intervention to protect private firms, United States investors found manifold opportunities in Latin America. Moreover, reciprocal tariff reductions and Export-Import Bank credits stimulated North-South commerce. Vital raw materials flowed to the United States from Latin America following the outbreak of World War II.

At the same time, political advantages accrued to Washington in return for unequivocal abandonment of military intervention and liberalized trade policies. Whereas only eight Latin American nations declared war on the central powers in 1917-1919 and none dispatched troops to Europe, the situation would change radically during World War II.

Though it advanced United States interests to speak, temporarily at least, of the "equality of American states and multilateral policy-making," no institutions developed to achieve these goals. Decisions emanated from Washington, and Uncle Sam remained a Gulliver amid the Latin Lilliputians. Nor was attention focused on the internal problems besetting each hemispheric state—gross income inequities, feudalistic social structures, lopsided development, predatory militarism. While promoting American exports and security, good neighborism served to freeze the socio-economic, political status quo. Despite its immediate success, it is difficult to perceive enduring contributions of the policy to inter-American relations or to conditions in the hemispheric republics.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of April, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Asian Development Bank

Apr. 13—It is reported that, at a meeting in Sydney, Australia, the bank's international board of governors decided to increase the amount available for "soft" loans to needy nations over a long term at lower interest rates.

Disarmament

Apr. 8—The acting U.S. representative, Adrian A. Fisher, submits a proposal to the 17-nation disarmament conference in Geneva, giving the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna complete responsibility for checking U.S. and Soviet compliance with a cut-off in the production of nuclear materials for weapons.

International Monetary Crisis

(See also *France*)

Apr. 23—For the second day, the French franc falls to 4.970 francs to the dollar, the unofficial intervention rate set by the Bank of France. The French central bank uses its dollar reserves to defend the franc.

Latin America

(See also *Cuba*)

Apr. 14—In an address to delegates at the 13th meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, in Lima, Peruvian President Juan Velasco Alvarado asks for Latin-American solidarity with Peru in her dispute with the U.S. over the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company.

Apr. 22—In a statement to the board of governors of the Inter-American Development Bank at its 10th annual meeting, in Guatemala, Felipe Herrera, president of the Bank, declares that the industrialized coun-

tries are displaying a lack of solidarity in their trade policies and a sense of discouragement in their aid programs to underdeveloped countries.

Apr. 23—In Brasilia, the foreign ministers of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay sign a treaty for the joint development of the basin of the Rio de la Plata.

The Peruvian delegate to the meeting of the board of governors of the Inter-American Development Bank calls for an end of U.S. veto power over loans made from the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special Operations.

Middle East Crisis

Apr. 8—The chief delegates to the U.N. from the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain and France meet for the second time to discuss the Middle East crisis. They first met April 3.

An Israeli Army spokesman announces that Arab commandos have fired rockets into the Israeli port of Elath from the Jordanian town of Aqaba.

Israeli planes strike in retaliation against Aqaba; 8 civilians are reported to have been killed.

Apr. 10—Jordan's King Hussein, in the U.S., addresses the National Press Club in Washington. Declaring that he speaks for himself and for U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hussein pledges freedom of navigation for every nation through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. His 6-point peace program, embodying the major points of the U.N. resolution of November, 1967, is contingent on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory.

Apr. 11—According to *The New York Times*, Israeli officials describe King Hussein's peace proposal as propaganda.

Apr. 12—*Al Ahram* (a Cairo newspaper gen-

erally expressing the official view) publishes an article repudiating Hussein's statement that Israel would enjoy free passage through the Suez Canal following a Middle East settlement.

Apr. 14—King Hussein meets separately with the Big Four powers' chief delegates to the U.N. The delegates later hold talks on the Middle East crisis.

Apr. 16—For the 9th consecutive day, Israeli and Egyptian forces fire at each other along the Suez Canal.

Apr. 19—*The New York Times* reports that U.A.R. military communiqués have recently indicated that long-range artillery, supplied by the U.S.S.R., has been placed in position along the Suez Canal.

Apr. 20—Israeli officials report that yesterday U.A.R. commandos crossed to the Israeli-held eastern bank of the Suez Canal where they clashed with Israeli soldiers.

Apr. 21—Israeli planes, artillery and tanks attack Iraqi and Jordanian artillery emplacements in northern Jordan and the Jordan River valley.

Apr. 22—U.N. Secretary General U Thant, in a report to the Security Council, states that Israel and the U.A.R. are engaged in "a virtual state of active war," and "that the Security Council cease-fire has become almost totally ineffective in the Suez Canal sector. . . ."

Apr. 23—Mohammed H. el-Zayyat, chief U.A.R. spokesman, announces the U.A.R.'s repudiation of the Security Council cease-fire agreement ending the June, 1967, war.

The Israeli government, in a note to U Thant, appeals to the Security Council to compel the U.A.R. to respect the 1967 cease-fire agreement.

Apr. 25—From Cairo, it is reported that the U.A.R. is protesting the cease-fire line along the east and west banks of the Suez Canal; the U.A.R. insists that Israeli forces had not advanced to the eastern bank of the Canal when the U.N. Security Council adopted the cease-fire resolution in 1967.

Apr. 30—Israeli commandos attack power lines and bridges on the Nile River in U.A.R. territory. Israeli Premier Golda

Meir's office issues an official announcement that the raid was staged "to remind the Egyptian authorities of their responsibility for violating the cease-fire agreement. . . ."

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *Canada*)

Apr. 10—At a formal ceremony to mark the 20th anniversary of the signing of the NATO treaty, U.S. President Richard Nixon reminds delegates that the tensions of the past 20 years were not due to "superficial misunderstandings." Yet, he continues, NATO could relax its defensive posture if world conditions should change.

Apr. 11—NATO foreign ministers, concluding a 2-day meeting, issue a communiqué affirming the need to maintain NATO's military defenses and authorizing the North Atlantic Council, NATO's executive body, "to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution." The statement is interpreted as a response to last month's bid by the Warsaw Pact powers for an East-West conference.

Organization of African Unity

Apr. 18—A series of meetings on the Nigerian civil war opens in Monrovia, Liberia.

Southeast Asia

Apr. 3—An 8-nation Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia opens in Bangkok, Thailand.

United Nations

(See also *Middle East*)

Apr. 1—The Security Council approves (11 to 0 with 4 abstentions) a resolution condemning Israel for her March 26 attack on the Jordanian town of Salt.

Apr. 17—The President of the U.N. General Assembly, Emilio Arenales, dies.

Apr. 18—It is reported that in separate notes, Britain, France and the U.S. have told U Thant that the U.N. must institute eco-

nomies if they are to continue paying the U.N.'s bills.

War in Vietnam

Apr. 3—*The New York Times* publishes a report listing the total number of U.S. servicemen killed in Vietnam since the first U.S. fatality on December 22, 1961. The toll is 33,641 men, which is higher than the Korean war combat death toll.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, in a television interview, discloses that private talks on ending the Vietnam war have shown "some sign of progress."

Apr. 9—In the 7th attack on Saigon since the enemy offensive began on February 22, 1969, 4 giant rockets are fired into the outskirts of Saigon.

Apr. 10—In Paris, the U.S., South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the N.L.F. hold their 12th plenary session of the peace talks.

Apr. 11—With the enemy offensive in its 7th week, Allied commanders report that last night the enemy struck at 45 military and civilian targets in South Vietnam.

Apr. 17—*The New York Times* reports that U.S. military leaders in South Vietnam believe that their arguments against a cut-back in the conduct of the war have prevailed with officials in the Nixon administration.

Apr. 18—At a news conference, U.S. President Nixon asserts that the chances for peace in Vietnam have improved "significantly" because South Vietnam is now stronger politically and militarily. He reports that he has not and will not order "any reduction of our own activities" in Vietnam.

Apr. 19—The South Vietnamese Air Force receives a squadron of 20 jet fighter-bombers from the U.S.

Apr. 23—In Washington, informed sources report that the Paris peace talks have made no progress since President Nguyen Van Thieu offered to meet secretly with the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam; no secret direct talks have taken place.

Apr. 25—U.S. B-52's drop 3,000 tons of

bombs on the South Vietnam border area near Cambodia.

ARGENTINA

Apr. 23—One policeman is killed and 2 are wounded when federal police investigating a wave of terrorism raid an apartment in Buenos Aires. After the raid, more than 100 Peronists and other suspects are arrested.

BOLIVIA

Apr. 27—President René Barrientos Ortuño is killed in a helicopter crash. Vice President Luis Adolfo Siles Salines is sworn in as his successor, to serve until the 1970 elections.

CAMBODIA

Apr. 16—At a news conference in Phnompenh, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, chief of state of Cambodia, says that the U.S. has formally promised to recognize Cambodia's boundaries and neutrality, and that talks will soon begin to prepare for resumption of diplomatic relations between the 2 states, broken off by Cambodia in May, 1965.

Apr. 30—At a news conference, Sihanouk rejects the U.S. initiative directed toward restoring relations between the 2 states.

CANADA

Apr. 3—Canada will begin a phased reduction of her armed forces in NATO at the end of 1969, according to Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Canada now has 10,000 troops stationed at 2 bases in West Germany.

Apr. 10—Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of External Affairs, announces that Canada and Communist China will open substantive talks leading to an exchange of diplomatic recognition.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Apr. 12—An attempted coup by army officers is foiled and its leaders are sentenced to death. President Jean Bedel Bokassa announces a series of arrests and a shakeup of the army leadership.

Apr. 13—Health Minister Alexandre Banza is executed for his role in the attempted coup against the government.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Apr. 1—The first meeting of the Chinese Communist party congress to be held since 1958 is convened in Peking.

Apr. 12—The Central Committee is enlarged to 99 members, and the standing committee is enlarged to 22. Many of the new members are university-trained specialists and technicians.

Apr. 14—A new charter adopted by the Communist Party Congress names Defense Minister Lin Piao as heir to Mao Tse-tung.

Apr. 28—The first session of the Central Committee of the Communist party to meet after the 9th party congress closed April 24 elects a 21-man politburo and a standing committee of 5.

CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)

Apr. 8—The Kuomintang party unanimously reelects President Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang has been President since 1938.

CUBA

Apr. 5—Cuba begins a month-long labor mobilization to speed the 1969 sugar harvest. Over 500,000 city workers, students, soldiers and housewives are scheduled to be sent to the fields.

The Havana radio announces that *El Mundo*, Cuba's oldest newspaper, ceased publication today; its employees will be transferred to *Granma*, the official publication of the Communist party.

Apr. 11—In an editorial, *Granma* charges that "Yankee reactionary newspapers" are "waging a campaign of provocation against Cuba" aimed at "creating difficulties in the functioning of the Cuban mission at the United Nations." The charge represents Cuba's first reaction to reports in the New York press that the U.S. government has denied reentry visas to 2 members of

the 17-man Cuban mission to the U.N. and that 5 other Cuban diplomats may not be allowed to return if they leave the U.S.

Apr. 23—Spain delivers 27 more shrimp boats to Cuba, bringing to 74 the number of boats delivered under a contract which calls for 90 vessels.

Apr. 26—In a press interview in Lima, Peru, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the Cuban delegate to the United Nations Latin American economic conference in Lima, declares that Cuba is not interested in an agreement or contract with the U.S., and expresses little interest in restoring relations with the nations of Latin America.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Apr. 3—Communist party leader Alexander Dubcek warns the Czech people of "tragic consequences" if anti-Soviet violence continues.

Apr. 7—Following Soviet orders, new security restrictions are imposed in Prague.

Apr. 8—A decision by the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party to punish journalists who publish articles at variance with party policy is announced.

Apr. 11—Slovak Communist party leader Gustav Husak attacks party leaders for permitting "antisocialist forces free scope in public life."

Apr. 13—According to an announcement by the Czechoslovak defense ministry, Czechoslovak troops will join with Warsaw Pact forces in maneuvers.

Apr. 16—A group of pro-Soviet conservatives is absolved of treachery and collaboration in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Apr. 17—Under pressure from pro-Soviet forces, the Communist party's Central Committee removes Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary and gives the post to Gustav Husak.

Apr. 18—New party leader Gustav Husak warns "counter-revolutionaries" that he will brook no resistance to party decisions.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Apr. 21—President Joaquin Balaguer dis-

misses 2 members of his cabinet to satisfy opposition demands: General Braulio Alvarez Sanchez, national police chief, criticized for his handling of street terrorists, and Luis Alfredo Duverge Mejia, Education Secretary, criticized by student groups.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis*)

Apr. 10—The Bank of France announces a further decline in gold and currency reserves. Over-all losses for the week ending April 3 totaled \$9.5 million.

In a 50-minute television broadcast, President Charles de Gaulle says he will resign if the voters turn down his bill to divide France into 22 almost autonomous regions and to transform the Senate into a consultative body, among other constitutional reforms.

Apr. 17—Foreign exchange reserves fall again. \$33.6 million was sent abroad in the week ending April 16.

Apr. 28—Results of yesterday's voting on the constitutional reform referendum reveal that de Gaulle's proposed changes have been rejected. De Gaulle resigns. Senate President Alain Poher becomes acting President until new elections can be held in May.

Apr. 29—Georges Pompidou, former French Premier, announces his candidacy to succeed Charles de Gaulle as President. He receives the endorsement of the Gaullist party.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Apr. 29—According to a statement by Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss, a revaluation of the German mark will be approved if West Germany's major trading partners simultaneously revalue their currencies, and if revaluation is accomplished in a calm atmosphere.

GHANA

Apr. 2—The head of state, Joseph Ankrah, resigns after admitting he took political contributions from a private company.

Apr. 8—Akwasi Afrifa, the new chairman of the National Liberation Council (Ghana's ruling group), ends a 3-year ban on political activity. After May 1, 1969, political parties may be established.

GREECE

Apr. 9—Three basic constitutional rights are restored by the military government of Premier George Papadopoulos: the inviolability of homes, and the rights of association and of assembly. The measures are seen as an attempt to avoid condemnation by the Western powers who are attending a NATO conference in Washington, D.C.

Apr. 11—Former Greek government officials, led by Demetrios Papaspyrou, president of Greece's last parliament, deride the restoration of some civil rights as "eyewash," because martial law continues.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

ITALY

(See *United Kingdom*)

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

LEBANON

Apr. 24—Premier Rashid Karami submits his resignation in a dispute over restrictions imposed on commandos operating against Israel. The guerrilla camps have been swept by violence following government attempts to impose a curfew.

MEXICO

Apr. 14—Police arrest 70 students following a spontaneous rally in Mexico City calling for more student authority in running the country.

PAKISTAN

Apr. 4—The new president of Pakistan,

A. M. Yahya Khan, who took power after Mohammed Ayub Khan resigned the presidency March 25, restores portions of the constitution but continues the ban on most rights and freedoms. Free speech and assembly, freedom of movement, the right to form associations and to contest rulings in court are still banned.

PERU

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

RUMANIA

Apr. 12—The Communist party newspaper *Scinteia* declares that the Warsaw Pact organization will not be allowed to dictate orders to Rumanian troops nor to send foreign troops to Rumania.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Czechoslovakia*)

Apr. 5—*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, a leading party newspaper, publishes an attack against Yugoslavia.

Apr. 9—The 30 Soviet ships in the Mediterranean Sea are joined by 7 additional ships.

Apr. 12—Talks with Communist China over the border dispute on the Ussuri River are proposed by the Soviet government. The proposal is presented in a note to the Chinese embassy in Moscow.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

UNITED KINGDOM

Apr. 9—The second *Concorde* supersonic jet airliner developed jointly by Great Britain and France makes a successful maiden flight at Bristol, England. The French version was flown March 2.

Apr. 15—The 1969-1970 budget is announced by Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins. Taxes are increased by \$816 million; two-thirds of the increase is to be levied on business.

Apr. 19—Civil rights rioting breaks out again in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, as Roman Catholic civil rights demonstrators are attacked by Protestants.

Apr. 21—Bombs are exploded at a reservoir and in 9 post offices in an outbreak of mob violence in Northern Ireland.

Apr. 24—Northern Ireland's Prime Minister, Terrence O'Neill, wins his party's approval by a narrow margin for "one man, one vote" legislation to increase the rights of Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland.

Apr. 28—O'Neill announces he will resign as soon as a new party leader is chosen, citing loss of support for his attempts to introduce reforms to ease religious tensions.

British officials join with visiting Italian President Giuseppe Saragat to pledge greater efforts for European unity. The announcement comes directly after news of the resignation of French President Charles de Gaulle.

British Territories

Anguilla

Apr. 12—British Minister of State Lord Caradon announces he will replace Anthony Lee as British Administrator. Lee has been the focus of Anguillans' hostility in their 2-year rebellion against the Federation of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla.

St. Lucia

Apr. 12—St. Lucia's first general election since she became a British associated state will be held April 25, it is announced in Castries.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Apr. 2—In New York, 21 Black Panther party members are indicted on charges of conspiring to dynamite New York City department stores and to kill policemen.

Apr. 3—Illinois Governor Richard Ogilvie calls out 7,000 Illinois National Guard troops as rioting breaks out in Negro areas of Chicago, on the eve of the first anniversary of the murder of civil rights leader Martin Luther King.

Apr. 4—Violence breaks out in Memphis, Tennessee, during memorial services for Martin Luther King.

Apr. 8—The Department of Justice files a

suit charging that the Cannon Mills Company in North Carolina practices discrimination against Negroes in employment and in rental of company housing; this is its first discrimination suit against a major Southern textile concern.

Apr. 16—After a meeting with President Richard Nixon yesterday, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert Finch says that the administration does not plan any changes in the existing school desegregation guidelines.

Apr. 17—A federal judge in Brooklyn, New York, rules that a local draft board may not punish a registrant for violation of the Selective Service System's "delinquency regulations" by ordering him to report for immediate induction. The "delinquency regulations" are "not authorized by law," according to the judge.

Apr. 19—Resumption of federal funds for Columbia, South Carolina, schools is ordered by a federal hearing examiner who has upheld Columbia's modified freedom-of-choice school desegregation plan.

Apr. 25—After leading a march of more than 3,000 strikers protesting the dismissal of 12 members of a nonprofessional hospital workers local in Charleston, South Carolina, the leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Ralph David Abernathy, is jailed for violating an injunction against the local Negro union, which is fighting for recognition.

Economy

Apr. 3—The Federal Reserve Board raises the discount rate (the interest rate it charges banks who borrow from the Federal Reserve) from 5.5 per cent to 6 per cent, the highest rate since October, 1929. Some \$650 million in lendable bank funds are frozen when the Federal Reserve System increases the percentage of bank funds that must be held as reserves with local Federal Reserve banks.

Apr. 4—President Nixon announces that the U.S. balance of payments problem must be solved by correcting the "root causes of our problem," not by "a patchwork quilt of

controls." Three controls over U.S. lending and investment abroad are relaxed, permitting a theoretical increase of \$400 million in the dollar flow for direct investment in 1969.

Apr. 17—The Department of Commerce announces that the Gross National Product rose by \$16 billion in the first quarter of 1969.

Apr. 23—The Department of Labor reports that the rise in consumer prices in March, 1969, was .8 of 1 per cent, the sharpest price rise for any month since the Korean War inflation peak.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; Cambodia; Czechoslovakia*)

Apr. 1—President Nixon talks separately with 12 leaders of foreign countries who are in Washington to attend the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Apr. 7—Secretary of State William P. Rogers declares that the U.S. plans to begin talks on strategic missile arms limitation with the U.S.S.R. in "late spring or early summer."

Rogers announces that economic aid and trade concessions for Peru will continue; he says that Peru is willing to resolve problems of compensation through litigation for her expropriation of U.S.-owned oil facilities.

Apr. 8—President Nixon confers with Jordan's King Hussein in Washington and urges efforts to settle the crisis in the Middle East.

Apr. 11—The President confers with Mahmoud Fawzi, special assistant to U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Apr. 14—On the 21st anniversary of the establishment of the Organization of American States, President Nixon pledges the "highest priority" for Western Hemisphere problems.

Apr. 15—North Korea declares that she has shot down a U.S. Navy electronic intelligence plane with a crew of 31. Department of Defense spokesmen say that an air-search for the missing plane has begun. So-

viet destroyers are reported aiding in the search. (See also *U.S., Military*.)

Apr. 18—President Nixon orders reconnaissance flights resumed off the North Korean coast and pledges that the U.S. will protect the unarmed planes.

At his news conference, the President criticized the Soviet Union for the ousting of Czechoslovak Communist leader Alexander Dubcek and warns that in the future similar Soviet action may affect Soviet relations with the U.S.

Apr. 24—In Washington, reliable sources report that, as part of a \$30-million arms agreement, the U.S. has agreed to sell Jordan a squadron of 18 F-104 jet interceptors. This is the second squadron the U.S. has agreed to supply; the first is scheduled for June, 1969, delivery, after a long delay.

Government

Apr. 1—Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the Interior, allows the resumption of drilling operations on 5 federal leases in California's Santa Barbara Channel; 67 other leases remain shut down.

The Food and Drug Administration says it intends to act to prevent the marketing of 78 drug products containing antibiotics because, it claims, they expose patients to "an unnecessary risk."

Apr. 8—President Nixon sets aside \$200 million for rebuilding riot-damaged areas in 20 cities. The funds were appropriated by Congress in 1968 for various urban programs.

Apr. 9—Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., resigns as chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. A Negro and a Democrat, Alexander charges "a crippling lack of Administration support" for his work.

The President names Mrs. Virginia H. Knauer as his special assistant for consumer affairs; Mrs. Knauer is director of the Pennsylvania State Bureau of Consumer Protection.

Apr. 11—President Nixon restricts the trans-Pacific airline route awards originally

granted by President Lyndon Johnson.

Apr. 12—The President reveals that revisions in the Johnson administration budget will yield a reduction of \$4 billion; the revised budget calls for a \$5.8 billion surplus for fiscal 1970, the largest budget surplus since 1951.

Apr. 14—A study released by the Office of Economic Opportunity maintains that children who have participated in the government's Head Start Program for disadvantaged children do not achieve on any higher level in the first, second and third grades than children who did not attend Head Start classes.

In a message to Congress at the end of its 10-day Easter recess, President Nixon outlines a 10-point domestic program, including tax reform, an increase in Social Security benefits, new measures to counter crime, and a reorganization of the Post Office.

Apr. 15—The administration reveals 50 revisions in the nondefense budget of the Johnson administration that make up a reduction of \$2.9 billion.

Apr. 17—William G. Madow of Stanford University, an independent consultant for the O.E.O., asks to have his name removed from the report on Head Start; other critics charge that there are "many many scientific holes" in the study released April 14.

Apr. 18—President Nixon reveals that he has decided not to name Franklin A. Long, vice president for research and advanced studies at Cornell University, as director of the National Science Foundation, because of Long's opposition to the antiballistic missile program.

Apr. 21—The President recommends that Congress reduce the income tax surcharge from 10 per cent to 5 per cent, effective in January, 1970, if it also repeals the 7 per cent tax credit to business, effective at once.

The President announces his appointment of Representative Donald Rumsfeld (R., Ill.) as director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and as an assistant to the President with Cabinet rank.

Apr. 23—In the first of 4 special messages to

Congress, the President urges a \$61-million program to counter organized crime, concentrating on the gambling operations of the Mafia.

Sirhan Bishara Sirhan is condemned to death in the gas chamber for the assassination in June, 1968, of New York Senator Robert Kennedy. On April 17, the same jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree. The sentence will be appealed.

Apr. 24—The President asks Congress to raise postage rates, including a raise in the first class mail rate from 6 cents to 7 cents an ounce.

Apr. 25—The Food and Drug Administration establishes general sanitary regulations to apply to all processors whose products are used directly as food; these are the first general regulations to apply to food processors.

Apr. 26—The Small Business Administration admits that it channeled more than \$1 million in loans to a trucking concern with Mafia connections; some of the money was loaned to the company after its Mafia connection was discovered.

Apr. 28—Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney announces that President Nixon has ordered a major reorganization of the Model Cities Program to give local authorities increased power.

The President admits that he was mistaken in his refusal to appoint Franklin Long as director of the National Science Foundation. Long has reportedly rejected the President's new offer of the post.

Apr. 29—In an impromptu speech to a Washington meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, President Nixon upholds the principle of responsible dissent but denounces campus disruption and calls on the universities to "stand up against this kind of situation." His remarks follow continuing student disorders at Harvard, Cornell, Columbia, Queens College, City University of New York, Williams, Colgate, Princeton, Fordham, and other colleges and universities around the nation.

Apr. 30—The President asks Congress to give

him authority to consolidate many of the 500 separate aid programs in the cities and states.

Labor

Apr. 2—In Galveston and Houston, Texas, longshoremen ratify a labor contract and return to work, bringing the maritime strike to an end after 103 days. The strike began December 20, 1968; it is estimated to have cost \$4 billion.

Apr. 13—After more than 28 hours of negotiation in the office of Labor Secretary George P. Shultz, the 10,000-member signalmen's union and the railroads settle a wage dispute, averting a nationwide strike.

Apr. 28—The United Automobile Workers strike because of organizational changes at General Motors Corporation plants; 28,000 workers are idle.

Military

(See also *Foreign Policy*)

Apr. 1—Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, reveals that because of cuts in the defense budget there will be a more than 10 per cent cut in the number of B-52 bomber raids in South Vietnam.

Apr. 7—14 soldiers go on trial by court martial for mutiny; the commander of the Sixth Army has ordered general courts martial for 27 soldiers who engaged in a sitdown protest on October 14, 1968, at the stockade in the Presidio army base in San Francisco. In addition to the 14 on trial, 8 have already been convicted, 3 have escaped and the trials of 2 have been postponed. The men were protesting conditions in the stockade and the fatal shooting of a prisoner by an armed guard.

Apr. 14—The Army orders the undesirable discharge of Pfc. Dennis Davis, editor of an antiwar underground G.I. newspaper. Davis was scheduled for honorable discharge April 30.

Apr. 21—A task force of 23 warships including 3 attack aircraft carriers sails into the Sea of Japan to protect future flights of U.S. reconnaissance planes off the coast of North Korea.

Apr. 25—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird declares that if the U.S.S.R. continues to stockpile missiles it might have 2,500 long-range missiles by 1975; the U.S. is not planning to increase its force, now totaling 1,054.

Apr. 26—The Defense Department announces that Task Force 71—now unofficially reported to comprise nearly 40 vessels—is moving from the Sea of Japan into the Yellow Sea off the west coast of Korea.

Apr. 27—Task Force 71 is reported by the Defense Department as being reduced in size. Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) charged earlier today that the force was not sent into the Yellow Sea but was ordered to leave Korean waters.

Politics

Apr. 1—Democrat David R. Obey wins the seat formerly held by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in the Seventh Congressional District in Wisconsin; he is the first Democrat to win the seat in the twentieth century.

Apr. 14—Maryland Representative Rogers C. B. Morton succeeds Ray C. Bliss as chairman of the Republican National Committee; he declares that he plans a campaign to support the administration's request for a Safeguard antiballistic missile defense system.

Supreme Court

Apr. 1—The Court agrees to hear an appeal to consider whether the civil rights law of 1866 requires private clubs to admit Negroes for membership on an equal basis with whites.

Apr. 7—The Court rules unanimously that the First Amendment protects a person's right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home.

The Court rules 6 to 3 that New York congressional districts must be reapportioned before the 1970 election; the 1968 reapportionment of congressional districts in New York violates the principle of one man, one vote.

Apr. 21—The Court rules 6 to 3 that poor

people who have recently moved from one state to another cannot constitutionally be denied welfare benefits by the states: the 1-year residency requirements in Connecticut, Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia violate freedom to travel.

Apr. 22—The Court rules 6 to 2 that if suspects in a case are rounded up by police in a "dragnet" operation to be fingerprinted, the results of the tests cannot be used in evidence at a trial.

VENEZUELA

Apr. 7—Venezuela announces the renewal of diplomatic relations with Peru, which were broken in October, 1968.

Apr. 9—The Venezuelan Supreme Court annuls the election of Marcos Pérez Jiménez, the former dictator, as Senator for the Caracas Federal District; his election is illegal because he failed to fill the requirements as an "elector."

Vietnam, Republic of (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Apr. 7—Speaking at the opening of the new session of parliament, President Nguyen Van Thieu outlines a 6-point peace plan to end the war.

Apr. 27—Ten political parties in South Vietnam agree to form a pro-government alliance; a national convention is scheduled for May.

Apr. 30—Tran Buu Kiem, chief negotiator for the National Liberation Front, says in Paris that the Front is ready for talks with other parties "on the basis of its position" to get the peace talks moving.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Apr. 13—Elections for deputies to the 5 chambers of the federal parliament begin; voting will continue through May 7.

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PRESS, INCORPORATED



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